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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
March 28 1986 Conference
List 1, Sheet 1
No. 85-1200-AFX

B

CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMr-1 1 N, et
al. (regulates mining)

from

(Wallace, Poole, Ste-

)

v.
GRANITE ROCK CO. (mines on
federal land)

Timely

Federae p l

------

1. SUMMARY: Appt contends that

\

t{

~vironmental

private mining on federal national forest land had
by the 1872 Mining Act and

u.s.

r~n

~t been
--~--

\

of

preempted

---------

Forest Service surface use regula-

tions?
2. FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW: Appee is presently engaged in commer'--

cial mining of a valuable five to seven-acre quarry of high calcium

·po<.:,!PONE- ~}A

tA ~-~-~.J..............,_.....h.."""'-::--"~-:--""'------>_VL..__....w_<,_w f~ ) ~ fka.- ;~St.t.L a-~ch

a

~ Llltt~ry

whiting grade limestone on and around Mount Pica Blarico in the Big Sur
'i
region of Los Padres National Forest. Its mining acti i vity in Big Sur,
an area of great scenic beauty, includes blasting and opening a quarry, constructing and improving roads, building a bridge, boring test
holes and conducting core drilling, improving a water storage system,
and dumping rock waste in a disposal area.

Appee has perfected mining

claims in the area by locating a valuable mineral deposit, by complying with locational requirements, and by carrying out at least $100
worth of labor on the claims since 1959.
In 1981, as required by Forest Service regulations, appee submitted a Plan of Operations for approval by the District Ranger covering
the period from 1981 to 1986.

The plan was accepted with certain mod-

ifications and with the proviso that appee be responsible "for obtaining any necessary permits required by State and/or county laws, regulations and/or ordinance."
In

19~3,

the District Director of the California Coastal Commis-

sion ("CCC") informed appee that it needed to secure a permit for its
mining operations from the CCC pursuant to the provisions of the California Coastal Act ("CCA").

Appee then brought an action in USDC

(N.D. Cal.: Schwarzer, J.) to enjoin CCC officials from requiring a
coastal development permit.
Appee first argued that provisions of the Coastal Zone Management
Act ("CZMA"), 16

u.s.c.

§§1451 et seg, incorporated by the CCA in Cal.

Pub. Res. Code §3008, prevented state

regulatio~

-

The CZMA generally

ation in a "coastal zone", but exempts from its
cov~~ d

~

------

"the use of which is by law subject solely to the dis-

cretion of the Federal Government" and land "the use of which ••• is

"'----··---------

held in trust by the Federal Government."

The DC

fo~nd

'

at issue here did not fall within these exclusionary

l;

that the land

~ ~revisions.

Fed-

eral property encumbered by perfected mining claims is by law not subject "solely" to the govenment's discretion.

Nor is the land "held in

trust" since that phrase was intended to cover Indian lands.

Accord-

ingly, appee's claim was a "coastal zone" and the CZMA permitted state
regulation.
The DC next rejected appee's contention that the CCA is preempted
by the federal Mining Act and the Forest Service regulations promulgated pursuant to that Act.
The CA9 reversed.

The case need not be decided with reference to

the CpMA, since the Mining Act provides a
ing the preemption issue.

~~~r

The

ground" for decids stated in

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104
is preempted if
given field."

~

th ~ .

law

is evidence of Congressional intent to "occupy a

Even if Congress has not entirely displaced state regu-

lation, state law is still preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law.

The legislative intent of the CZMA with re-

spect to preemption is clear: It simply left the preemption issue unchanged from previous legislation.
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972

See Conf. Rep. No. 1544, 92d

u.s.

Code Cong. & Ad. News 4822,

4824 ("the Conferees •.. adopted language which would make certain
that there is no intent in this legislation to change Federal or state
jurisdiction or rights in specified fields.").

Therefore, the preemp-

tion issue must be resolved by analyzing the 1872 Mining Act.
The purpose of the Mining Act is to encourage mining on federal
lands.

In 1970, Congress renewed its adherence to this policy, al-

though it also declared its fidelity to the additional goal of lessening any adverse environmental impact from
§2la.

s~ch mining.~

30

u.s.c.

Although a general federal purpose to encourage a particular

activity does not automatically preempt state environmental regulation
that incidentally discourages the activity, see, e.g., Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., supra, at the same time it is not true that a state
regulation that prohibits mining unless the miner obtains a state permit automatically escapes preemption if issuance of the permit is conditioned only on reasonable requirements.
Electric Coop. v. FPC, 328

u.s.

In First Iowa Hydro-

152 (1946), the Court held that the

Federal Power Act, which establishes a federal permit system authorizing the construction of hydroelectric dams, preempted a state law that
prohibited such activity unless the petitioner first obtained a state
permit.
The First Iowa doctrine applies to this case.

Forest Service

regulations mandate that the power to prohibit the initiation or continuation of mining in national forests for failure to abide by applicable environmental requirements lies with Forest Service.
§§228.4-.5 (1984).

36 C.P.R.

The counter position -- that the Mining Act and

these regulations do no more than encourage mining subject to minimum
federal environmental regulation, leaving the states free to condition
the ability to mine on adhering to more stringent requirements, see,
e.g., State ex rel. Andrus v. Click, 97 Idaho 791, 554 P.2d 969 (1976)
-- is unpersuasive.

At the same time, however, the federal regula-

tions do not go so far as to occupy the field of establishing environmental standards, striking a federally-determined balance between encouraging mining and protecting the environment in national forests.

The Forest Service regulations recognize that a state 1may enact environmental regulations in addition to those
agencies.

~stablishe~

by federal

Moreover, States may urge the Forest Service to withhold or

revoke a federal mining permit from a miner who does not abide by all
applicable state and federal standards.

But an innependent state per-

mit system to enforce state environmental standards would undermine
the Forest Service's own permit authority and thus is preempted.
3. CONTENTIONS: Appellant contends that whether states may apply
their own police power regulation to mitigate the adverse effects of
private mining on federal land is a recurring federalism question of
great importance to the Western States.

The Forest Service regula-

tions at issue here apply to 140 million acres of land, 38 Fed. Reg.
34817 (1973), much of it in the West.

Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Ore-

gon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming all have adopted environmental permit regulation of mining on lands within their boundaries, including
federal lands, similar to the California scheme invalidated here. Dual
regulation protects both the state and federal interests involved, and
for more than a century this dual regulation, envisioned in the 1872
Mining Act, has been a paradigm of cooperative federalism.

The CA9's

decision conflicts with decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Wyoming Supreme Court, as well as with an intermediate appellate court
of Oregon.

See State ex rel. Andrus v. Click,

supra~

State ex rel.

Evans v. Click, 102 Idaho 443, 631 P.2d 614 (1981), cert. denied, 457

u.s.

1116 (1982); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation

Comm'n, 693 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 1985)

~

State ex rel. Cox v. Hibbard, 31

Ore.App. 269, 570 P.2d 1190 (1977).

The CA9's decision misconstrued the Forest Service regulations.
'--.-------

'~

I

The regulations are replete with provisions sanctioni pg the application of state law to mining operations.
§228.8(a)

(state air quality standards).

See, e.g., 36 C.P.R.
Moreover, by providing that

state "certification[s]" or "approval[s]" of compliance with state
laws may be accepted as satisfaction of "similar or parallel requirements of these regulations," id., §228.8(h), the Forest Service regulations necessarily presume the existence of independent state permit
systems.

Also telling is the fact that for more than 70 years after
r

the passage of the 1897 Organic Administration Act, the Forest Service
thought that it lacked authority to adopt surface protection regulations like those in 36 C.P.R. §§228.1-.15: the states filled this void
prior to 1974.
Rather than heeding the admonition that preemption turns on the
unique features of the particular federal regulatory program involved,
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411

u.s.

624, 638 (1973),

the CA9 posited a general preemption principle of no dual federal and
state permits.

The notion that the coincidence of federal and state

regulation automatically leads to preemption was rejected long ago.
California v. Zook, 336

u.s.

725 (1949).

Thus, the predicate for

what the CA9 called the "First Iowa doctrine", is an intent to eliminate dual regulation or to "occupy the field."

Applying this stand-

ard, the regulations are not preempted.
The CA9's decision to reach the merits violates the ripeness doctrine.

Because the CCA on its face does not prohibit all mining, and

because the CCC has consistently acknowledged throughout this litigation that it cannot prohibit all mining or block the exercise of pri-

vate mining rights, California can and should be allowed to prudently

\

'

construed and apply its regulation to avoid any

actua ~

conflicts with

federal regulation.
Eight western states and the territory of American Samoa have
filed an amicus brief in support of appellant.
ally regulated in this area.

States have tradition-

Many western states have created permit

systems and established environmental protection standards that apply
to mining claims on federal lands.

The decision below, in addition to

conflicting with the decisions cited by appellant, also conflicts with
Mt. Emmons Mining Co. v. Town of Crested Butte,

~90

P.2d 231 (Colo.

1984).
Appee answers that appellate jurisdiction does not lie under
§1254(2).

Appellate jurisdiction is proper only when a statute is

expressly invalidated, and does not lie in situations, such as the
present case, where the state's exercise of authority is struck down
without reference to a specific statute.
Corp., 464

u.s.

238, 247 (1984).

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee

See also Burger King Corp. v.

Rudzewicz, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2181 n.l2 (1985); Perry Education Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460

u.s.

37, 42-43 (1983).

The CA9 did

not strike down a specific provision of the CCA, but merely held that
the CCC's purported exercise of land use permit power was preempted.
The decision below does not conflict with the decision of any
~

other federal Court of Appeals.

[NB: Appee fails to mention the two

state Supreme Court cases cited by appt.]

Moreover, the CA9's deci-

sion follows the rationale of Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601
F.2d 1080 (CA9 1979), which was summarily affirmed by this Court, 445

u.s.

,», ..

947 (1980).

The decision below is plainly correct, properly re-

lying on Court decisions such as First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v.
FPC, supra.

'

i

Appt's ripeness assertions are precluded,··jby its admis-

sions in its answers to the complaint, wherein appt conceded that the
applicability of the CCA to the dispute was "ripe."
The Alaska Miners Association has filed an amicus brief in support of appee.
appeal.

The

Section 1254(2) does not confer jurisdiction over this

cz~m

permits state regulation in coastal zones, but ex-

eludes from the coastal zone "lands the use of which is by law subject
solely to the discretion of or which is held in trust by the Federal
government, its officers or agents."

16

u.s.c.

§1453(1).

Since in

fact the CCC lacks state statutory and regulatory jurisdiction to impose such permit requirements outside the coastal zone, no state statute or regulation has been held unconstitutional.

On the merits, the

CCC cannot saddle approved mining operations conducted on federal
lands with a duplicative permit system supplanting federal prerogatives.
The American Mining Congress has also filed an amicus brief in
support of appee, arguing that the pervasive federal legislative and
regulatory scheme demonstrates an intent to supplant state permit systerns.
In reply, appellant contends that appee ignores the conflict between the decision of the CA9 and decisions of the Idaho and Wyoming
Supreme Court and that Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp. involved an
entirely different regulatory program which implicated different state
and federal interests.
4. DISCUSSION: Appellate jurisdiction appears ~properly~ ie
over this appeal.

.._

I

'

The strongest argument to the contrary derives from

Silkwood.

There, the CAlO had invalidated a punitive damages award on
I

preemption grounds.

Appellant argued that because theII basis for the

award was a state statute the CAlO necessarily had he,f d that the statute was unconstitutional, at least as applied.

464

u.s.,

at 246.

The

Court disagreed with that proposition, explaining that "we have consistently distinguished between those cases in which a state statute
is expressly struck down on constitutional grounds and those in which
an exercise of authority under state law is invalidated without reference to the state statute.

The former come within the scope of

§1254(2) 's jurisdictional grant.

[Cites]

The latter do not.

Education Ass'n, supra, at 42: Hanson v.· Denckla, 357
(1958): Wilson v. Coook, 327

u.s. 474, 482 (1946) ."

Perry

u.s. 235, 244
464 u.s., at 247.

The Court also observed that statutes authorizing appeals are to be
strictly construed.

Id.

Nonetheless, in contrast to Silkwood, a state statute here was
expressly mentioned and, indeed, was the centerpiece of the litigation
~

below.

None of the cases cited in Silkwood involved preemption.

The

Court has exercised appellate jurisdiction over appeals from CA decisions holding that a state statute was preempted.
_!y_ v. Gulf Oil Corp., 445

preemption decision) .1

u.s.

947 (1980)

E.g., Ventura Coun-

(summarily affirming on CA9

It seems to me, therefore, that a strong case

1 Appt is correct that the Court's summary affirmance in this
Ventura County does not control here. Among other differences,
the federal statute there was the 1920 Mineral Lands Leasing Act,
not the 1872 Mining Act involved here. An intention to preempt
state legislation in the former would not evidence an intent to
preempt in the latter. See also Pet. for Cert. at 25 n.25
(citing commentator for the proposition that the two Acts "stand
incongruously side by side each shaped by the political and
economic forces peculiar to its own era").

can be made that appellate jurisdiction is proper.

The issue seems to
I

be sufficiently close, however, to warrant a

,

"postpon~"

..

I·

"note".

rather than a

\

Even if appellate jurisdiction is eventually determined to be
improper, certiorari jurisdiction would of course lie, and a "grant"
...___- ....._ - --...... -----·-..._. --~..---....... --~-would appear to be appropriate. Appt correctly characterizes the
.....

issue as one of great importance.

Certainly a large amount of real

-------

number of Western states have statutes similar to those found preempted here: appee does not contend that the California regulatory regime
is sui generis.

Moreover, there is

a ~ a~spli~:fbetween

the Supreme Courts of Idaho and Wyoming.

the CA9 and

The CA9 explicitly acknowl-

edged below that it was refusing to follow the decision in State ex
rel. Andrus v. Click, supra.

It is of no consequence, as appee im-

plies, that the split is not among the CA's: Rule 17 indicates that
one factor considered when reviewing a petition for certiorari is
whether "a federal court of appeals has decided a federal question in
a way in conflict with a state court of last resort."
Appt's ripeness argument appears to have little force.

Appt ap-

pears to have conceded ripeness below, although, of course, this concession is not controlling on the Court.

Moreover, in Ventura County

the CA9 entertained a declaratory judgment action in similar anticipatory circumstances, and was summarily affirmed by the Court.
One last point deserves mention.

The CA9 decided this case on

preemption grounds, concluding that this approach was "narrower" than
deci~her the CZMA permission of state regulation of only

"coastal zones" would limit the application of the CCA.

Appee will

presumably be free to urge this point in support of the judgment below
if the Court agrees to review this case.

C~.

Quinn v ' United States,

I!

No. 84-1717 (seven votes to "DIG", presumably on basis that point
urged by resp in support of judgment obscured primary "question presen ted") •

Nonetheless, as the CA9's recognition of the broadness of

this point suggests, the interpretation of the CZMA is itself an important matter.

And even if appee is able to construct an argument

from the CZMA that requires affirmance, the Court would always be free
to decide the Mining Act preemption issue and then remand on the CZMA
issue.

Finally, judging from the CA9's brief examination of the leg-

islative history, the CZMA has no independent preemptive force of its
own: therefore, the CZMA should not obscure the Mining Act preemption
issue appt presses here.
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend POSTPONE.
There is a response.

Cassell

Ops in Juris. Stat.

March 21, 1986

Court ................... .

·voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued . .................. , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .
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Announced .. , ............ . 1 19 .. .
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85-1200 California Coastal Commission v.
Granite Rock Company
{CA9)
MEMO TO FILE:

,J~~ u

(

Appellee

is

.a--H- ~J

engaged

in

mining

chemical

grade

-

white limestone on an unpatented mining claim on federal
land

in

Los

California.
acres

in

Padres

National

Forest

at

Pico

Blanco

in

The mine is an "open pit" some five to seven
total.

The

state

of

California's

brief

emphasizes the "scenic beauty" of the "nationally renowned
Big Sur Coast".

Pico Blanco is a mountain that is visible

from a

traveled

heavily

tourist road.

According to the

state, the mining activities include bulldozing, blasting
and evacuating lime from the pit quarry, and disturbs the
visual

landscape.

Commission

{the

Appellant,
State)

environmental interest.

brief

the

California

emphasizes

the

Coastal
state's

(W~1-)

Appellee,

that prevailed before CA9, states that
/\
this mineral deposit is the largest of its kind in the
eleven western states to seven acres.

though the pit i { limited to five

The deposit's importance derives from the

2.

grade

and

purity

of

the

limestone

pharmaceutical

purposes,

"environmental

applications

rain, etc."

and

that

also

has

including

is
a

used

for

number

of

control

of

acid

(Appellee's brief, p. 7).

This case presents the question whether federal
law

preempts

Commission

the

(appellant}

on federal land,
been

issued

to

The DC found
Judge

authority

of

the

California

Coastal

to require a state permit to mine

particularly where a federal permit has
appellee

by

no preemption,
reversed,

Wallace

the

,.. -

Federal Forest Service.

but CA9

-

concluding

Mining Act and Forest Service

in an opinion by
that

the

Federal

regulations preempt

state

law.
A preliminary question arises from the fact that
we

"Postponed".

The

parties

appellate jurisdiction exists.

disagree

In any event,

clear conflict and I would grant cert on
(that I will refer to as the State)
case is not ripe.

as

it.

to

whether

there is a
Appellant

also argues that the

The courts below disagreed, and so do

I.

Although there are several federal statutes, the
CA viewed the
Service

187~ ~ining ~ct,

regulations,

as

implemented by the Forest

controlling.

The

"Property

3.
'

.,,''I

I·

the Constitution provides that "Congress shall
have power

to dispose of and make all needful Rules and

Regulations

respecting

the

territory

belonging to the United States."

or

other

property

Art. IV, §3, Cl. 2.

-----·-

The

federal government holds title to the land in question as

""'--=-----..-a'--n~a--t~· Appellee

argues that California

has no inherent police power to regulate mining activity
on federally owned

land.

Appellant

(the State)

concedes

that the Property Clause grants Congress legislative power
over

federal

lands

but

The

State

legislative

power

to

unless

until

exclusive.

- -··- --and

argues

that

the

insists

that

it

regulate

Congress

the

use

power
has

of

not

concurrent

federal

affirmatively

is

lands

exercises

property clause power to preempt state legislation.

its

There

is no express exercise of such power.
The State's brief
always

be

said

decision of
rule".

is well written

(this cannot

for

California

briefs).

It

as

announcing

a

and

CA9

"wooden

attacks

the

mechanical

It cites from a Forest Service regulation (that I

have not checked)
"occupy the

as

field",

indicating no federal
as

intention to

the regulation recognizes that a

state "may enact environmental regulations in addition to
those established by federal agencies".

.. '

Here,

the state

..1

I·

"
argues,

regulation

"clearly

by

complements

protection
resources."

Although

surprisingly,

did

protection
state

California Coastal

the

objective

environment,

the

not

Forest

the

1872

mention

the

the

environment

obligation.

The

need
-

is

parties

to

forest

Act,

not

protect

the

with reason -

both

do

resource

national
Mining

~

the state argues
of

Service's

preserve

to

Commission

not

a

federal

agree

as

that
and

to

a

the

effect of the State's requirement of an additional permit.
As

noted

above,

the

________
State insists
___.,.

that

its

regulatory

authority - including the requirement of a state permit in
addition to federal authorization the

Fore~~ ions.

there is an actual conflict.

simply "complements"
Appellee

answers

that

Appellee has operated this

mine for over two years without objection from the State
Commission, and now the state demands that appellee obtain
a state permit or discontinue is mining operations.

See

Joint Appendix 22-23.
I have not studied the case sufficiently to know
to

what

extend

the

state

permit,

by

its

terms,

would

conflict with the federal authority to operate the mine.
I

assume

that

the

state

would

impose

additional

environmental protection requirements, but I have found no

5.

indication of

the

extent

to which

these

would

handicap

appellee's operations beyond having another bureaucracy to
deal with.

I would like my clerk's view as to this.

As there is
of the

federal

n ~ express

preemp t ive

legislation or,

I

J an~uage

believe,

in any

in the Forest

Service regulations, CA9 relied on the legislative history
including

statements

Committee

reports.

Statement,

A-5,

et

in

the

See
seq.

legislative history, but

and

Conference

Appendix

to

The State,

Senate

Jurisdictional

also relies on the

cite~ statements

by individual

"\

members of Congress.

* * *
I

-~-----

had dictated the foregoing before receiving a

typewritten copy of

the SG' s

amicus brief that strongly

supports

of

That

Mining

affirmance
Act

and

Forest

CA9.

Service

court

relied

regulations

in

on

the

finding

preemption, and found it unnecessary to decide whether the
Federal Coastal Zone Management Act
state

regulation on federal

(CZMA)

also excluded

-

property.

The SG,

however,

states that the California Coastal Commission's proposed
regulation
federal

is

lands

"specifically

prohibited

exclusion."

It

is

also

by

the

CZMA's

inconsistent,

according to the SG, with federal land use principles, and

--

6.

.
'I

I~

the

existing programs

federal

lands.

The

for

managing mining activities of

"CZMA

directly

Commission's contentions."
states

must

exclude

from

answers

Section 304(a)
their

coastal

the

Coastal

provides that

zone management

programs, "lands the use of which is by law subject solely
to the discretion of
officers or agents."
goes

on

at

the
16

u.s.c.

considerable

federal government,
§1553(1).

length

The SG's brief
support

to

its

these

conclusions.
My

preliminary

brief

supports my

CA9's

decision

scanning

tentative

primarily

on

of

view
the

the SG' s
that

we

typewritten

should

reasoning

of

affirm

the

SG.

Unless my clerk has a different view, a summary memorandum
will

suffice.

It

would

be

helpful

specifically than I have above,

to

identify

the relevant language in

the federal acts and the Park Service regulations.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

more

rjm 10/08/86
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"·
Questions Presented (revised by me): '

.'
'I

•

,· j

Does the Court have appellate jurisdictiod under 28

1.

u.s.c.

§1254(2)?
2.

Does

federal

law preempt

appt' s

power

to

require

appee to secure a permit.

I.

FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Appee owns
Na ~ ,

____

unpatented
in the Los Padres
---.:::..----- mining claims
__,.
....,

near

the Pacific Ocean in central California.

Because the claims are unpatented, the federal government retains
fee title to the property.

In 1980, appee began the administra-

tive steps required for opening a mine on this property.

As re-

quired by Forest Service regulations, it submitted a plan of operations

to

the

Forest Service.

Those

regulations

require

an

environmental assessment and consultation with responsible state
agencies.

Also,

because the land is near the coast, California

agencies have a statutory right,
,

under the Coastal Zone Manage__.......

.::>

m~ (th ~ , to insist that the plan be consistent with
state environmental regulations.

Appt,

the responsible Califor-

c~

~

~tf
- ~f

In 1981, the Forest

&L£

Service approved a modified plan of operations, which ran through

~~

to appee's plan.

~

~t;

February 26, 1986.
Two years

later,

in October

1983,

appt

advised

appee

operating its mine unless it obtained
Appee

filed

suit

in N.D.Ca,

arguing

that the

~tfJ"J-1

(~r
~)
~

3.

state

permit

requirement was preempted.

N.D.Ca concLuded
1

that

I

the CZMA did not shield appee's activity, because that Act does
not protect purely private commercial activity from state environmental regulation.
ting

The court went on to hold that the permit-

requirement was not preempted by any of the other federal

statutes in the area.
On appeal,

CA9

reversed.

Declining to reach the CZMA

question, Judge Wallace relied on the Forest Service permitting
requirement.
quirement

In his view,

was

inconsistent

an

independent state permitting

with,

and

preempted

by,

the

re-

Forest

Service's permitting authority.
This Court accepted the appeal and postponed consideration of its jurisdiction to argument on the merits.

II.

A.

JURISDICTION

Appellate Jurisdiction
Under 28

Court

from

u.s.c.

federal

CAs

§1254(2), appeals can be brought to this
"by a party relying on a State statute

held by a court of appeals to be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution,

treaties or

laws of the United States."

I

conclude

that there is no such jurisdiction.
The Court has refused to accept jurisdiction under this
section when "an exercise of authority under state law is invalidated without reference to the state statute."
McGee Corp.,
case,

464

but did not

u.s.

238,

247

(1984)

(you

Silkwood v. Kerrdissented

indicate any disagreement with the

in

this

jurisdic-

q.

I

tional analysis).

CA9 may hav

to require a permit,
Silkwood,

464

u.s.,

but

invalidated the

"the

at 247.

authori~y

of appt

was left untouched."
As appee points out,

has not identified any section

(or a single word,

appt's brief
for that mat-

ter) of the California Public Resources Code invalidated by CA9's
decision.

Nor does Judge Wallace's opinion specifically invali-

date any such section.

The decision is directed more at appt's

actions than at its enabling statute.
Similarly, the Court has been reluctant to accept jurisdiction in the absence of a square holding that a state statute
is

invalid.

2174,

2181

E.g. ,
n.l2

Burger King Corp.

(1985).

In

this

v.

case,

Rudzewicz,
there

is

10 5 S.

Ct.

considerable

doubt that the California legislature intended appt to require a
permit for a mine on federal land.
coastal zone

For lands excluded from the

(as the SG argues these lands are), appt can exer-

cise its authority only to the extent "consistent with applicable
federal and state laws."
(West Supp. 1986).

Cal.

Pub.

Resources Code Ann.

Cf. Calder v. Jones, 465

u.s.

§30008

783, 787 (1984)

(declining jurisdiction over an appeal from a decision interpreting

a

state

long-arm

statute;

the

statute

expressly

tied

its

reach to federal law, so it could not be repugnant to federal law
for purposes of section 1254(2)).

Even granting appt's conten-

tion that these lands are part of the coastal zone, doubt remains
as to whether the statute was intended to apply here; it does not
expressly authorize application to operations on federal lands.
CA9's decision had no occasion to address these questions.

Thus,

I do not believe it has the firmness of impact on state law this

J.

I

Court traditionally has demanded to justify exercise of. its manlt

'I

datory jurisdiction.

I

There are plausible arguments to the contrary,

though.

This Court has interpreted section 1254(2) 's requirement that a
"statute" be

invalidated quite broadly.

Thus,

even administra-

tive regulations may come within the scope of the statute.
Stern, Gressman & Shapiro §2.7, at 52.

See

But I do not think this

helps appt in this case, because they cite no regulations invalidated by CA9's decision.

The

~ly wri~~ I

consistent with CA9's decision are the
appee to seek a permit.

l ~rs

have seen in-

from appt ordering

"Invalidation" of such a letter does not

pose the type of state-federal conflict that motivated Congress
to maintain the Court's mandatory jurisdiction in this area.
You might

try

to pin appt down at oral argument.

In

particular, it would be useful to force him to point to some particular state enactment no longer in force because of CA9's decision.
that

But absent some startling development there,
you

vote

to dismiss

the

appeal

for

want

I

of

recommend

jurisdiction

under section 1254(2).

B.

Mootness
The SG suggests that the case may become moot, because
Brief

for

the

United

States, at 7 n.6.

This is another good subject for clarification

at oral argument.

But I do not think the case is likely to be-

come moot.
nor

the

Appt contends that neither the CZMA, the Mining Act,

Forest Service's

regulations

preempt

its

authority

to

~

6.

I

require a permit.
. h 1· t s
1 1s

·
own perm1t
process,

permit process.
Thus,

burden.

If appt should prevail here,

it COU,'ld estab'1

·
1 y separate from the
'I federal
ent1re

Appee has a substantial interest in evading that
I

do not

think

this case will be moot,

even

if

appt now is examining appee's new plan for consistency under the
CZMA.

C.

Ripeness
I agree with you that this case is ripe.

Appee does not

claim that the burden of the state permitting process is unreasonable.

Appee claims that federal law precludes appt from bur-

dening it at all.

D.

Certiorari Jurisdiction
If the Court dismisses the appeal for want of jurisdic-

tion,

it then will examine the papers as a petn for certiorari.

See 28 U.S.C. §2103.

Efficient administration counsels strongly

against complete dismissal of a

case after oral argument,

when

all the parties and amici have gone to the expense of providing
briefs, and when all the Justices have gone to the labor of considering the case.
You

indicated

that

you

thought

the case was

and would be inclined to grant certiorari.

important

Although I agree,

I

wish to point out a few reasons that counsel against such a vote.
First of all, the case is relatively unusual.
most States
review.

•'

exercise

their

statutory right

I would think that
to CZMA consistency

Appt's case arises only because it neglected to do so.

7.

This

instinct

is

this Court nor

lack of ' precedents'•
., , neither
I·..1
federal CA has examined any of the complex

confirmed by

any

the

The case is indeed complicated.

statutory questions presented.

The Court should think twice about entering such a thicket with-

~

out

~

any

prior

guidance

from

lower

courts.

This

is

especially

true in this case, where you are inclined to reject appt's position

on

a

theory

not

reached

below,

and

not discussed

in the

briefs of appt or any of his amici.
Nevertheless,

I

reluctantly agree that,

at this stage,

it is best to grant cert and review CA9's decision.

III.

THE STATUTORY BACKGROUND

Because of the multiplicity of statutes relevant to the
permit received by appee,

I

think it is best to review briefly

the important federal statutes in the area before examining the
legal questions this case presents about those statutes.

A.

Federal Mining Laws
Although

Congress

passed

specific

mining

statutes

in

1866 and 1870, the basis for federal mining law in the intervening century has been the General Mining Law of 1872, ch. 152, 17
Stat.

91

Law).
with

Under this statute,
no prior

u.s.c.
can

---------=-----

(codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§22-39)

§22.

stake

'

·-

permit or

(the Mining

individuals can enter federal lands,

charge,

to prospect

for minerals.

30

Prospectors who discover valuable mineral deposits
out,

or

"locate"

their

claims.

A properly

located

~d~

8.

claim

is

usually

referred

to

as

an

unpatented

mining

claim.

Under the Mining Law, such a claim is transferable and exclusive.
30

u.s.c.

If a prospector "patents" his claim, he obtains

§26.

fee simple title to the minerals.
clear

The legislative history makes

that the general purpose of the law was to encourage the

development of mineral resources on federal lands.

The continu-

ing vitality of this policy is demonstrated by its frequent appearances in preambles and legislative histories of statutes in
the area down to the present day.

w

As appt notes at some length, the Mining Law specifically retains State law in some areas.

--------------------

""

For

instance,

prospectors

can enter federal lands only in accordance with "the local customs or

rules of miners

U.S.C. §22.

in

the several mining districts."

30

Congress similarly prescribed the adoption of State

laws governing location and recording of claims, 30
and statutes of limitations, 30

u.s.c.

§38.

u.s.c.

§28,

Most importantly for

the present controversy, Congress has retained a provision of the
1866 Act, providing:

As a condition of sale, in the absence of necessary
legislation by Congress, the local legislature of any
State or Territory may provide working rules for working mines, involving easements, drainage, and other
necessary means to their complete development. Act of
July 26, 1866, §5 (formerly codified at Revised Statutes §2338, and currently codified at 30 u.s.c. §43).
As

the

commercial

importance

of

federal

lands

in

the

West has increased, and as environmental consciousness has risen,
the States have begun to insist that their views be considered in
decisions

of

federal

administrators

regulating

mining.

These

9.

concerns culminated in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
of 1976

(FLPMA),

43 U.S.C.

§§1701-1782.

In the FLPMA, Congress

gave States an explicit role in management of the federal lands.
The Act directs the Secretary of the Interior to develop land use
plans for the lands within his jurisdiction.
Secretary

shall

coordinate

[his

plans]

In doing so,
with

the

"the

land · use

planning and management programs of other Federal departments and
agencies and of the States and local governments within which the
lands are located . . . . Land use plans of the Secretary ... shall
be consistent with State and local plans to the maximum extent he
finds consistent with Federal law and the purposes of this Act."
43 U.S.C. §1712(c) (9).

As the SG explains, this Act ensures that

the interests of state regulatory authorities will be considered
by the Secretary of the Interior, but it leaves ultimate control
over federal land in the hands of the Secretary.

The legislative

history provides

interpretation.

considerable

support

for

this

E.g., H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1274, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 58, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong.

& Ad. News 6228, 6229.

does not apply in this case,
forest.

I

This statute

because the mine is in a national

include the statute here because it is an important

part of the congressional scheme.

-

B.

Federal Forest Laws
Section

codified

at

16

1

of

u.s.c.

the

Organic Administration Act

§§478,

551,

authorized

Agriculture to regulate notional forests.

of

1897,

the Secretary of

But that section spe-

' 10.

cifically reserved the rights of entry granted to prospectors by
the Mining Law.

See 16 U.S.C. §478.

Under the authority of section 551,
rnulgated regulations authorizing mining.

the Secretary pro-

36 C.F.R.

§228.1-.15.

Because the Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over the national forests,

it

is these regulations which

implement the provi-

sions of the Mining Law as to national forests.
ulations,

a prospector must subrni t

Under these reg-

a plan of operations to the

District Ranger in charge of the area.

Section 228.8 deals with

requirements for environmental protection.

That section provides

that all mining operations "shall be conducted so as, where feasible, to minimize adverse environmental impacts on National Forest surface resources."

It includes specific requirements that

the operator comply with a variety of federal statutes (the Clean
Air

Act,

the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,

etc.}.

The

regulations also explicitly require compliance with state standards for air quality, water quality, and the disposal and treatrnent of solid wastes.

Section 228.8(a)-(c}.

Finally,

the sec-

tion provides that "[c]ertification or other approval issued by
State agencies or other Federal agencies of compliance with laws
and regulations relating to mining operations will be accepted as
compliance with similar or parallel requirements of these regulations."

Section 228.8(h}.
After

these regulations were promulgated,

Congress be-

carne concerned about the lack of a general plan for

Accordingly, Congress passed the For~f?l
Renewable Reso_u__
r _c _e_s___P~l_a_n_n~i_n_g___A_c_t'-~of ~
·

national forest resources.
est

and

Rangeland

'

...

the use of

11.
"'I

'I
(FRRRPA), codified as amended at 16

u.s.c.

§1600-1687.

In 1976,

when Congress passed the FLPMA, creating similar planning procedures

for

all

federal

lands

(discussed

National Forest Management Act of 1976

above),

(NFMA), 16

1614, substantially amending the FRRRPA in.
national forests

the other

it enacted

u.s.c.

section 6 (a)

idea of the FLPMA,

of the NFMA,

16 U.S.C.

§§1600-

The NFMA extended to
participation of

state authorities in forest resource-use decisions.
ly,

the

Specifical-

§1604 (a),

requires the

Secretary of Agriculture to develop land management plans, "coordinated with the land and resource management planning processes
of State and local governments and other Federal agencies."
also 16

u.s.c.

§1712

(requiring

See

the Secretary to hold hearings

and receive comments from state and local regulators).

Although

---~

this section is worded slightly more narrowly than its FLPMA analogue, 43
cation

u.s.c.

§1712(c) (9)

that Congress

(discussed above), there is no ind ?-

intended

the provisions to be

interpreted

differently.

C.

The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)
The Court recently considered this statute in detail in

CZMA was enacted to encourage "prudent management and conservation of

natural

resources

in

the coastal

zone."

To encourage

States to develop coastal zone management plans, Congress provided

that

the

federal

government would

subsidize any

meeting the standards of the federal CZMA.

state plan

The California Coast-

~

.........
I

al Commission, appt in this case and in Secretary of the Interi~~

or,

was established

in conformity with

the CZMA;

its ' I plan was

approved in 1977.
Like the FLPMA and the NFMA discussed above,
contemplated

an

important

role

for

state

regulation.

the CZMA
but

the

CZMA goes farther than either of those acts, which stopped short
---=--

at requiring federal
regulators.

regulators to consider the views of state

CZMA

The CZMA provides that federal activities within the

coastal zone must be "to the maximum extent practicable, consist16
§1456

u.s. c.

(c) (2).

A

~ of

the

Act

is

the

definition

of

the
I•

"coastal zone,"

16 U.S.C.

§1453

As the Court explained

(1).

in (!..cr4A...f-tJ...

Secretary of the Interior, this definition presents a compromise
between the original Senate and House versions of the Act.

-;.

0

v--J /"\A

~

" '

The

House Bill provided that all lands nea r the coast would be within
the coastal zone, directly subject to the state coastal zone authorities.

The

Senate

bill

excluded

As a ~mpromis;?,

coastal zone.

federal

lands

from

the

the Conference excluded federal ~ J..~
~

lands

from the coastal

zone per

se,

~t

provided that

federal .£<.~

activities on those lands would remain subject to review for con- ~.~
··c~~

sistency with
fected"

u.s.,
TICE

the

state

co as tal

at 322-23.
O'CONNOR's

regulation
zone.

if the activities "directly af-

See Secretary of

Interior,

464

(In Secretary of the Interior, you joined JUSopinion,

which

held

"directly affect" the coastal zone.
case,

the

that oil

leasing does not

This is not an issue in this

because all parties concede that appee's activities "di-

'

'

;p--1Jn-u..

,,

13.

rectly affect" the coastal zone.)
regulators

cannot

dilatory action,

frustrate

Finally, to ensure ,hat state

federal

land-use

'I

planning

through

the CZMA provides a strict and speedy timetable

within which States must assert their rights to consistency review.

See 16

u.s.c.

§1456 (c) (3).

IV.

ANALYSIS

With this framework in hand
issues of the case.

I turn to the substantive

First, I discuss the question that exerci~es
-J

the SG:

whether appee's mine is in the coastal zone.

----------------

Although I

agree with the SG that the land is not in the coastal zone, I do
not

think

that question

resolves the case.

Thus,

I

turn to a

~+

...,__,

~M
~'"'-hd-

general preemption analysis to determine the legitimacy of appt's ~~'MI
permit

requirement.

I

- -

conclude

dL-'.....d..._

that the permit requirement

is .c.~ . ~

-

preempted because it poses a serious obstacle to the goals of the

~~

federal statutes that regulate appee' s mine.

A.

Is Appee's Mine in the Coastal Zone?
Section

1453 ( 1)

excludes

from

the coastal

zone

"lands

the use of which is by law subject solely to the discretion of or
which is held in trust by the Federal Government, its officers or
agents."

~

~ ~

The SG contends that the clause "lands the use of which

is by law subject solely to the discretion of .. the Federal Government" means "lands owned by the Federal Government."

I do not

find this a very persuasive parsing of the statutory text.
cretion" does not seem a likely surrogate for "ownership."

"Dis-

.14.

{!)

.
1/2) . 1
regulat1ons ~ g1s a-

But overwhelming evidence from the

'l

(;0

tive history, and this Court's decision in Secretary of the Interior support the SG's argument.
pret the statute
United

States.

.
~
d ence.)
t h 1s
ev1

ing

this

--------

These sources uniformly intera minimum, all land owned by

(I

summarize here only

the most persuasive of

~

section

provides:

"States

must

exclude

from

their ~

or whose use is otherwise by law subject solely to the discretion
the

Federal

~

. .
T h e Department o f Commerce regulat1on
expllcat- htl£.1.

coastal management zone those lands owned, leased, held in trust

of

~

the ~

Government."

15

C.F.R.

§923.33(a)

~

1
v~

~'j~'·

(emphasis

added) .
The

section-by-section analysis of

the Senate Bill

in

which this language originated provides:

The coastal zone is meant to include the non-Federal
coastal waters and the non-Federal land beneath the
coastal waters, and the adjacent non-Federal shorelands
including the waters therein and thereunder • . • . However, such requirements do not ... extend state authority
to land subject solely to the discretion of the Federal
Government such as national parks, forests and wildlife
refuges, Indian reservations and defense establishments." s. Rep. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1972)
(emphasis added).
Finally,

this

Court

has

described

the

exclusion

as

reaching "federal parks, military installations, Indian reservations, and other federal lands that would lie within the coastal
zone but for

the fact of

Interior, 464

u.s.,

federal ownership."

Secretary of the

at 323 (emphasis added).

Unfortunately, neither appt nor any of his numerous amici contest this argument in their submissions to this Court.

I

..

·.

15.

can,

however,

extract the gist of the argument made q;elow from

'I

the opinion of N.D.Ca, Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement, at
A-ll to -33

(finding that appee's mine was not excluded from the

coastal zone) .

N.D.Ca placed great emphasis on the plain lan-

guage of the statute.
in its mining claim.

Appee has an enforceable property interest
Although the federal government could regu-

late appee' s mining operations,

it could not remove the patent

completely without committing a taking.

Thus, N.D.Ca reasoned,

the use of the property is not subject solely to the discretion
of the Federal Government.
N.D.Ca found
cause

none

of

federal land.
to prevent
federal

the legislative history unconvincing,

it addressed private operations

taking

be-

place on

N.D.Ca found it hard to believe Congress intended

state

lands,

regulation not only of

federal

activities on

but of private activities on federal

land.

Ac-

cordingly, N.D.Ca found that appee's mining claim was not excluded from the Coastal Zone.
There is considerable merit to this argument.
noted above,

As I have

the language of the statute does not lead naturally

to the result the SG favors.

It is difficult to say that this

land is subject "solely to the discretion" of the United States.
It seems clear that appee has considerable discretion in his decision as to the scope of his mine.
But I am inclined nevertheless to accept the SG's interpretation.
tation,

Although the text does not mandate the SG's interpre-

it does

legislative

and

not mandate appt's
judicial precedents

interpretation either.
in support of

The

the SG seem

16.

impressive.

The SG's interpretation is more logical. ;he inter~....._____ '-- -~
,:1
pretation accepted by the de, drawing a line between private and
public activity, does not seem particularly plausible.
as

appee points

discretion

out,

over

the

Moreover,

the United States does have considerable
use

of

'---

the

~

"""""--

-

"\..--

~

"'---

land.

~

Although

'

L--

it

could

not

. ' .............,

"take" the claim, it probably could impose 'tegulati..ons so burden-

develo~en~~~

some as to preclude economically feasible

ing all of this, it seems best to accept the interpretation proffered by the agency administering the statute.

I recommend that

you decide that appee's mine is ~t part of the "' California coast-

,,

'r

~
~d.

al zone.

)1a--l ~
The SG and appellant seem to think that this conclusion

ends the case.

But I find the disposition more complicated.

review

for

the

mine,

;4 ~
~_nt.Sl-'>

~-

Indeed, the CZMA re-

of federal lands beyond the coastal zone.
consistency

/', /) ~ ·~
~

~brJ!_

No

provision of the CZMA explicitly bars state land use regulation

quires

~

whether

it

is

in

the

coastal zone or not.

On the face of the statute, exclusion from ~~

the coastal

only

------ ----......

zone has

...........

two effects.

--

First,

"1/

it changes the

.?X~

----~~

If the

~

mine is in the coastal zone, he must "insure that the project is,

cj~

test the Secretary must apply in the consistency review.

to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with approved state
management programs."
the coastal zone,
face
"that

of

state

the

chapter

or

security."

u.s.c.

If

§1456 (c) (2}.

it

is beyond

the Secretary can approve the activity in the

disagreement,

activity
is

16

is

after

consistent

otherwise necessary

Second,

exclusion

from

a

hearing,

with
in

the
the

the

if he determines

objectives

interest of

coastal

zone

of

this

national
precludes

17.

consistency review for activities that do not "directlr affect"
the coastal zone,

'I

like the oil leasing at issue in Secretary of

the Interior.
The

Secretary

of

Commerce's

support for this interpretation.

regulations

offer

strong

They provide:

In excluding Federal lands from a State's coastal zone
for the purposes of this Act, a , State does no t_impair
a ll}L. rigbts or authorities that it may have over Federal
land~ that exist separate from this program.
15 C.F.R.
§923.33 (c)(~ ---~
In light of this regulation, I hesitate to base a finding of preemption on the CZMA.
The
CZMA's

own

best

argument

preemption

against

provision,

this
16

position

U.S.C.

rests

§1456 (e)

on

(1).

the
That

section provides:

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to diminish
either Federal or state jurisdiction, responsibility,
or rights in the field of planning, development, or
control of water resources, submerged lands, or navigable waters.
This
ters.

section explicitly preserves

state rights

to regulate wa-

The Court could rely on Congress' failure to mention other

types of preserved rights as authorization to find preemption of
those other rights.
Of course, this interpretation does not explain away the
regulation.

Even if the regulation is broader than the statutory

preemption provision, I hesitate to label it invalid, particularly when none of the briefs even mention it.

The regulation could

.·

J.ts.

I

be distinguished by holding that the rights appt seeks 1to assert
'I
,: j

are not "separate from"
cause

appt

waived.

admits

the CZMA.

that

its

But this is problematic, be-

rights

under

the

CZMA

have

been

Appt seeks to assert the state's general police power,

which is indeed arguably "separate from" the CZMA.
In my opinion,

the best explanation for the regulation,

and for the statutory preemption provision, is that Congress assumed

the

states

had

no

land-use

regulation

rights

"separate

from" the CZMA, because earlier statutes in the area had preempted them.

Thus, I think the best course is to examine those ear-

lier statutes to see if they did preempt appt' s permitting authority.

If they did,

the Court need not address the unbriefed

questions regarding the CZMA.

B.

Preemption Analysis
This Court's typical preemption standard provides:

Congress' intent to pre-empt all state law in a particular area may Q.e _ i.D ferred where the scheme of federal
regulation is "s Uff ici ently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress "left no room" for
supplementary state regulation.
Preemp t ion o f a whole
field also will be inferred where the field is one in
which "the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement
of state laws on the same subject." Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc.,
105 S. Ct. 2371, 2375 (1985) (citations omitted).
Although the Court could dispose of the case under this
standard, the briefs suggest two reasons why the Court might wish
to

articulate

----

a

standard more

favorable

to

the United States.

First, the land is owned by the federal government.

Congress has

19.

"Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
'I
I

respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the Unit-

u.s.

ed States."
Mexico,

429 U.S.

preclude

the

Canst., art.
526

( 1976)

application

federal lands).

of

IV, §3, cl.

2; see Kleppe v. New

(holding that Congress has power to
state

police

power

regulations

to

The SG argues that state regulations cannot be

applied to federal lands "save as they may have been adopted or
made applicable by Congress.

Brief for the United States, at 25

(Quoting Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243
405

(1917).

u.s.

389,

Without going into detail, this standard seems ex-

treme to me.

In any event, you certainly need not go so far to

preempt the California regulation in this case.
Second, the parties argue for a blanket rule that a federal permit automatically preempts parallel state permit requirements.

The primary authorities for this position are First Iowa

Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 328

u.s.

152, 164 (1946), and

Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 601 F.2d 1080 (CA9 1979),
summ.

aff'd,

445

u.s.

947

(1980).

Again,

I

think

should not adopt such a per se rule in this case.

the

Court

The authori-

. /1l(....o

~

-

./1.-C-

ties

certainly

compel

no

such

rule.

First

Iowa simply

stated

that "[t]o require the petitioner to secure the actual grant to
it of a state permit •.. as a condition precedent to securing a
federal license •.. would vest in the
the federal project.
effectiveness of
context of
justifiable.

.

.•

~

.

the

[State]

a veto power over

Such a veto power easily could destroy the

the Federal Act."
Federal Power Act,

328
those

u.s.,

at

164.

statements

In the

seem quite

But I would hesitate to say that state permitting

~

20.

requirements necessarily are preempted by parallel fed'eral per-

1

mitting systems.

As for Ventura County, it is a summary affirm-

ance and thus of little precedential value.
setts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427

See, e.g., Massachu-

u.s.

307, 309 n.l (1976)

(per curiam).
The

great

variety

of

modern

congressional

schemes counsels strongly against per se statements.

regulation
Considering

the important state interests implicated by preemption, the Court
should tread cautiously before adopting broad per se preemptive
rules.

This case should be decided on the narrowest preemption

~

standard that a firm Court will accept.
Under

the

traditional

standard,

the

California permit

requirement would be preempted if the "scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room' for supplementary state regulation."

I think the facts of this case support a finding of pre-

emption

under

this

federal government.

standard.

First,

this

land

belongs

to

the

Although the Court has not yet clarified the

extent to which state police power can apply to federal lands in
the absence of congressional action, it is clear that Congress's
interests over

federal

land are dominant,

interests

small.

Second,

under

are

the

Forest

and that the State's
Service

Regulations

the OAA and the FRRRPA protect the same interests as the

challenged state

regulatory process.

Third,

in the NFMA,

Con-

gress has provided for state input into federal decisions about
the use of federal lands, requiring federal regulators to listen
to the concerns of state regulators.

__..
\'

....· .

~~

Finally, the federal regu-

21.

m~~e

lators have issued a permit, concluding that ' appee's

is the

!·l

1

best use of this particular parcel of federally-owned land.
I

do

not

think

anything

in

the

relevant

statutes and

regulations is inconsistent with this interpretation.

I discuss

only the major points here.

Appts rely heavily on 30 U.S.C. §43

(discussed

that

rules

above,

about

providing

easements

as

the States

conditions

of

can

enact

sale).

In

working

the

whole

scheme, this is just another of the areas in which Congress, recognizing

the diversity of mining conditions,

rules as federal law.

has adopted local

It is a long way from allowing states to

put conditions on sale to allowing them to frustrate more recent
statutes by regulating the use of federal land.
As for
36

C.F.R.

the Forest Service regulations,

§228.8(h),

which

allows

compliance

appt focuses on
with

"parallel"

state regulations to be taken as compliance with the Forest Service

regulations.

I

am

not

persuaded

that

the

Forest Service

meant by this to acknowledge that "parallel" environmental regulations applied of their own force to federal lands.

The regula-

tions specifically required compliance with certain state laws.
None of

those

laws are

relevant here.

I

think the regulation

referred to large operations, occurring partially on federal and
partially on
often

nonfederal

geographically

land.

National

intertwined.

It

and

seems

state

forests

efficient

for

are
the

Forest Service to accept state environmental findings about the
effects of an entire project if the state requirements are substantially identical to the federal requirements.

Little purpose

would be served by duplicate investigation when the state inves-

22.

tigation

must

occur.

Considering

compliance with certain state laws,
find

implicit

requirements

of

the

explicit

requifement of

'I

I

would not be inclined to

compliance

with

more

burdensome

land-use regulations.
It seems obvious that the congressional scheme would be
futile if the State could sidestep it and set up a parallel process.

Thus,

--------

I recommend that you find appt's permitting require-

-

ment preempted.

V.

CONCLUSION

I recommend the following:
(1) The appeal should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction under section 1254(2); treating the papers as a petition for
certiorari, cert should be granted.
(2) The state permit requirement is preempted.
"no room"

for

------

supplementary state regulation when

seeks to apply its regulations to federal land,
enacted statutes addressing the State's concerns,

(a)

There is
the State

(b) Congress has
(c) State regu-

lators have an opportunity to see that their interests are considered

by

the

federal

agency issues a permit.

j •

•

regulatory agency,

and

(d)

the

federal

~

'I

'

October 24, 1986
GRANITE GINA-POW
85-1200

California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock
Company (CA9) (Wallace, J.)
MISCELLANEOUS NOTES:
1. Jurisdiction

We "postponed".

As state law was invalidated, we do

not have jurisdictiion.
2.

Section 1254(2).

Treat as cert?

I could "deny".

There is "no

conflict", and CA9's decision is the law in California.
3.

On merits, am inclined to affirm.

Appellee is mining white limestone on federal coastal
land in California as authorized by Federal

~rvice.

(California

Coastal

Commission) made no objection for some two years.

Complex

Although

notified,

the

appellant

statutes and regulations govern a "cooperative" program of
coastal

development

particularly high.
Zone Management Act

where

enviornmental

concerns

are

The principle statute is the Coastal
(CZM),

of 1972

that was

enac~d~~

encourage appropriate use of coastal resources through the
development of state management programs for the "coastal
zone".
zone"

(

.n

~

)"

Section 304 (a)
to

include

of

coastal

that Act defines the "coastal
waters

and

submerged

lands

2.

extending

"seaward

to

the

outer

limits

of

the

U.S.

territorial sea".
For me, a critical fact is that the "lands" at issue
are owned

by the

the

provides

CZMA

federal government.
that

states

must

coastal zone management programs,
by

Section 304(a)
exclude

from

of

their

"lands the use of which

law are subject solely to the discretion of

the

federal government, its officers or agents."
Department of
implementing
Section 304 (a)

Commerce,

the

CZMA,

by

to require

the

agency

responsible

regulation

has

for

interpreted

that states exclude all lands

"owned, leased, held in trust or whose use is otherwise by
law

subject

solely

government".

Thus,

Coastal

to

the

discretion

according

~ ~a~.gme'Q);.

to

Program

the

of

the

SG,

cannot

federal

California's
be

applied

to

federally owned land.
The foregoing oversimplifies the vast complexity of
statutes and regulations,

but I find both Judge Wallace's

opinion and the SG's brief persuasive.
The most relevant case is Secretary of the Interior
v. California, 464 U.S.
this

case

would

be

312 (1984)

consistent

c/o'C).

with

Preemption in

Justice

O'Connor's

3.

opinion in that case.

I may await her discussion before

casting a final vote.
LFP, JR.

!

'·
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December 4, 1986
CALIFl SALLY-POW
MEMORANDUM
TO:

Justice Powell

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Dec. 4, 1986

85-1200 California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock
The

1.

Court

Treating

jurisdiction.

does

not

the papers as

have
a

appellate

petitioner

for

certiorari, I would grant cert.
2.
government,
16

u.s.c.

Because these lands are owned by the federal
they are excluded from the coastal zone

~1:1 ~

§1453(1).
3.

Nevertheless, the Coastal Zone Management Act

does not preempt the state's authority to regulate federal
lands.

Nothing

on

the

face

of

the

statute

complete preemption of state police power.

requires

The Secretary

of Commerce's regulations specifically preclude preemption
by this aspect of the Coastal Zone Management Act.
in

this

situation

I

do

not

believe the state can require a separate permit.

The land

The

federal

is

owned

by

~overnment has
~ issued a permit

the

federal

government.
use

authorizing

is

appropriate

this use.

and

has

Before it issued

2.

that permit, it considered the same environmental concerns
the state wishes

to consider

Also

issued

before

it

the

in its permitting process.
permit,

the

federal

agency

offered the state agency an opportunity to criticize the
proposed

use.

If

separate permit

we

here,

allowed
I

the

believe

state

to

it would

require

frustrate

a

the

purpose of the National Forest Management Act to provide
for

comprehensive

national

forests.

important

in

balance

this

two

federal

planning

Federal
case because

important

of

the

planning

is

uses

of

the

particularly

it allows one agency to

interests:

the

interest

and

expeditious development of federally mineral resources in
the interest in preserving the national forests.
Forest Service

balances

these

interests,

we

Once the

should

not

allow the states to balance them differently.
I

vote

to

affirm the

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

'

r'

judgment of

the Court of

Ut:l:t:ll IUt:l. "'+, I ':::100

,.,' ~
To:
Justice Powell
From: Ronald
Re:
No. 85-1200, California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock
Justice Scalia's memorandum of yesterday evening suggested two
problems. First, he noted that he wished to dispose of this case on the
narrowest possible ground, because he did not believe the hardest
question--whether states can require permits for activities on federal
lands--would occur again. If he wishes to dispose of this case narrowly,
you might recommend to him that, assuming he does not believe that there
is appellate jurisdiction, he vote to deny the petition for certiorari. In any
event, I do believe the question will reoccur, but probably only in CA9.
Because I believe CA9's judgment is correct, I would not be disappointed if
the Court denied cert.
Second, he believes the case is moot, because he believes federal
agencies routinely allow separate state permitting requirements. On this
point, I believe he misunderstands the statutory scheme. The Forest
Service regulations do require companies to secure state permits in
certain areas--like Clean Water and Clean Air permits. But the relevant
federal statutes specifically provide that federal agencies must comply
With state regulations in those areas. The Forest Service does not
routinely require companies to comply with more general state regulations
such as the land use regulations at issue in this case. Before approving a
particular use, the Forest Service listens to the views of the state agency,
but, acoording to the statute and regulations, the state's views in this
area are not determinative.
Thus, the case is not moot, by any means. If you find in favor of
Granite Rock, it can mTne under its soon-to-be-secured new federal permit
without applying to the California Coastal Commission for a separate
land-use permit. If you find in favor of the California Coastal
Commission, the Forest Service's permit will not
ff' · nt to allow
Granite Rock to mine; Gram e ock w1ll be forced to seek a separate state
permit. Moreover, even if my reading of the statutes is incorrect, the case
is not moot because--as California's attorney noted at oral argument--a
ruling in favor of the California Coastal Commission would allow that
agency to force Granite Rock to repair environmental damage it has caused
under the federal permit, damage that would not have been allowed under
state regulations.
In short, I do not believe additional briefing on mootness would be
useful.
#>=

..

Jn;rrtm.t Qfltttrl cf tqt ~nittb .ihitts
~aglfiug4m. '!]. ~. 21l~'l~
C HAM BERS O F

December 4,

JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA

1986

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co., No.

85-1200

I am inclined to favor disposing of this case on as
narrow a ground as possible, in that the difficult issue
to what extent a state can, without federal permission,
require environmental permitting on coastal lands -- is
unlikely to arise again.
It is apparently the Forest Service's
practice routinely to require compliance with such permitting
requirements.
One possible narrow ground of disposition is
mootness, but I do not think the record is adequately dev e loped
on this point.
At argument, I did not pursu e thi s lin e of inquiry b eca use
I was temporarily persuaded by Californi a 's argument that th e
dispute remained live because of reclamation issues.
Upon
reflection, however, I am not at all sure that California would
have any authority to imp ~amation require
ts even if it
ha
au
or1ty
o requ1re t e initial permit.
Granite Rock never
was required to obtain the permit, and we do not know what terms
such a permit would have contained.
Hence I am not sure how
California can impose reclamation requirements on the basis of
conditions it would have used its permitting authority to impose
but whose content we do not know.
I also am not persuaded that thJ s controversy is within the
"capable of re et~ tion" exception to mootness.
The Solicitor
Genera
points out in
1s brLe
that it may well not arise with
respect to Granite Rock's new plan, because California may be
able to accomplish everything it seeks to accomplish by its
permit requirement through consistency r e view.
Thi s i ss u e was n o t di sc u sse d in th e ce rti o r a ri b r i efs , a nd
was not really bri e fe ~ body other than th e
G (who did not
partic1 ate at the certiorari stage) at the merits stag e .
See
Brief for the SG at page 7 note 6.
California mentioned it in
passing in its merits brief at page 12 note 17.
I would find
briefing helpful.
Would an y on e else?
~
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CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS v. GRANITE ROCK COMPANY

~

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

u

[January-, 1987]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether Forest Service
regulations, federal land use statutes and regulations, or the
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), 16 U. S. C. § 1451 et
seq., preempt the California Coastal Commission's imposition
of a permit requirement on operation of an unpatented mining claim in a national forest.
I

Granite Rock Company is a privately owned firm that
mines chemical and pharmaceutical grade white limestone.
Under the Mining Act of 1872, 30 U. S. C. §22 et seq., a private citizen may enter federal lands to explore for mineral deposits. If a person locates a valuable mineral deposit on federalland, and perfects the claim by properly staking it and
complying with other statutory requirements, the claimant
"shall have the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of
all the surface included within the lines of their locations," 30
U. S. C. § 26, although the United States retains title to the
land. The holder of a perfected mining claim may secure a
patent to the land by complying with the requirements of the
Mining Act and regulations promulgated thereunder, see 43
CFR § 3861.1 et seq. (1986), and, upon issuance of the patent,
legal title to the land passes to the patent-holder. Granite
Rock holds unpatented mining claims on federally owned

1- f?.

1/7/PJ
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CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMM'N v. GRANITE ROCK CO.

lands on and around Mount Pica Blanco in the Big Sur region
of Los Padres National Forest.
From 1959 to 1980, Granite Rock removed small samples of
limestone from this area for mineral analysis. In 1980, in ac- cordance witli federal regulations, see 36 CFR § 228.1 et seq.
(1986), Granite Rock submitted to the Forest Service a five
year plan of operations for the removal of substantial
amounts of limestone. The plan discussed the location and
appearance of the mining operation, including the size and
shape of excavations, the location of all access roads and the
storage of any overburden. App. 27-34. The Forest Service prepared an Environmental Assessment of the plan.
App. 38-53. The Assessment recommended modifications of
the plan, and the responsible Forest Service Acting District
Ranger approved the plan with the recommended modifications in 1981. App. 54. Shortly after Forest Service approval of the modified plan of operations, Granite Rock began
to mine.
Under the California Coastal Act (CCA), Cal. Pub. Res.
Code Ann. § 30000 et seq. (West) (1986), any person undertaking any development, including mining, in the state's
coastal zone must secure a permit from j the California
Coastal Commission. §§ 30106, 30600. According to the
CCA, the Coastal Commission exercises the state's police
power and constitutes the state's coastal zone management
program for purposes of the federal Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq. (CZMA), described infra
pp. - - - - - . In 1983 the Coastal Commission instructed
Granite Rock to apply for a coastal development permit for
any mining undertaken after the date of the Commission's
letter.*
*The Coastal Commission also instructed Granite Rock to submit a
certification of consistency pursuant to the consistency review process of
the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), 16 U. S. C. § 1456(c)(3)(A),
described infra pp. - - . The Commission subsequently admitted
that it had waived its right to review the 1981-1986 plan of operation under
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Granite Rock immediately filed an action in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California
seeking to enjoin officials of the Coastal Commission from
compelling Granite Rock to comply with the Coastal Commission permit requirement and for declaratory relief under 28
U. S. C. § 2201. Granite Rock alleged that the Coastal Commission permit requirement was preempted by Forest Service regulations, by the Mining Act of 1872, and by the CZMA.
Both sides agreed that there were no material facts in dispute. The District Court denied Granite Rock's motion for
summary judgment and dismissed the action. 590 F . Supp.
1361 (ND Cal. 1984). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed. 768 F. 2d 1077 (1985). The Court of Appeals held that the Coastal Commission permit requirement
was preempted by the Mining Act of 1872 and Forest Service
regulations. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that these
statute and regulations do not "go so far as to occupy the field
of establishing environmental standards," specifically noting
that Forest Service regulations "recognize that a state may
enact environmental regulations in addition to those established by federal agencies," and that the Forest Service "will
apply [the state standards] in exercising its permit authority." 768 F. 2d at 1083. However, the Court of Appeals
held that "an independent state permit system to enforce
state environmental standards would undermine the Forest
Service's own permit authority and thus is preempted." Ibid.
The Coastal Commission appealed to this Court under 28
U. S. C. § 1254(2). We postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction to the hearing of the case on the merits,
- u. s. - (1986).
II

First we address two jurisdictional issues. In the course
of this litigation, Granite Rock's five-year plan of operations
the CZMA consistency provision by failing to raise its right to review in a
·
timely manner. App. at 17.
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expired. The controversy between Granite Rock and the
Coastal Commission remains a live one, however, for two
reasons. First, the Coastal Commission's 1983 letter instructed Granite Rock that a Coastal Commission permit was
required for work undertaken after the date of the letter.
App. at 22-24. Granite Rock admitted that it has done work
after that date. App. at 83. Because the Coastal Commission asserts that Granite Rock needed a Coastal Commission
permit for the work undertaken after the date of the Commission's letter, the Commission may require "reclamation
for the mining that [has] occurred, measures to prevent
pollution into the Little Sur River." Tr. of Or. Arg. 8.
Granite Rock disputes the Coastal Commission's authority to
require reclamation efforts. Second, Granite Rock stated in
answer to interrogatories that its "investments and activities
regarding its valid and unpatented mining claims require continuing operation beyond the present Plan of Operations,"
and that it intended to conduct mining operations on the
claim at issue "as long as [Granite Rock] can mine an economically viable and valuable mining deposit under applicable
federal laws." App. at 83-84. Therefore it is likely that
Granite Rock will submit new plans of operations in the future. Even if future participation by California in the
CZMA consistency review process, see infra pp. - - ---,
or requirements placed on Granite Rock by the Forest Service called for compliance with the conditions of the Coastal
Commission's permit, dispute would continue over whether
the Coastal Commission itself, rather than the federal government, could enforce the conditions placed on the permit.
This controversy is one capable of repetition yet evading review. See Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v. Gould,-- U. S.
- - , - - n. 3 (1986); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 333
n. 2 (1972). Accordingly, this case is not moot.
The second jurisdictional issue we must consider is
whether this case is properly within our authority, under 28
U. S. C. § 1254(2), to review the decision of a federal court of
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appeals by appeal if a State statute is "held by a court of appeals to be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties
or laws of the United States .... " Statutes authorizing appeals are to be strictly construed. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 464 U. S. 238, 247 (1984); Perry Education Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U. S. 37, 43 (1983). As
noted in Silkwood, supra, at 247, "we have consistently distinguished between those cases in which a state statute is expressly struck down" as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and those cases in which
"an exercise of authority under state law is invalidated without reference to the state statute." This latter group of
cases do not fall within this Court's appellate jurisdiction.
In the present case, the Court of Appeals held that the particular exercise of the Coastal Commission permit requirement over Granite Rock's operation in a national forest was
preempted by federal law. The Court of Appeals did not invalidate any portion of the California Coastal Act. In fact, it
did not discuss whether the CCA itself actually authorized
the imposition of a permit requirement over Granite Rock.
See Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. § 30008 (West) (1986) (limiting
jurisdiction over federal lands to that which is "consistent
with applicable federal ... laws"). Accordingly this case is
one in which "an exercise of authority under state law is invalidated without reference to the state statute," Silkwood,
supra, at 247, and not within our§ 1254(2) appellate jurisdiction. We therefore treat the jurisdictional statement as a
petition for certiorari, 28 U. S. C. § 2103, and having done so,
grant the petition and reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
III
Granite Rock does not argue that the Coastal Commission
has placed any particular conditions on the issuance of a
permit that conflict with federal statutes or regulations. Indeed, the record does not disclose what conditions the
Coastal Commission will place on the issuance of a permit.
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Rather, Granite Rock argues, as it must given the posture of
the case, that there is no possible set of conditions the
Coastal Commission could place on its permit that would not
conflict with federal law-that any state permit requirement
is per se preempted. The only issue in this case is this
purely facial challenge to the Coastal Commission permit
requirement.
The Property Clause provides that "Congress shall have
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States." U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. This
Court has "repeatedly observed" that "'[t]he power over the
public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations."' Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U. S. 529, 539 (1976),
quoting United States v. San Francisco, 310 U. S. 16, 29
(1940). Granite Rock suggests that the Property Clause not
only invests unlimited power in Congress over the use of federally owned lands, but also exempts federal lands from state
regulation whether or not those regulations conflict with federal law. In Kleppe, supra, at 543, we considered "totally
unfounded" the assertion that the Secretary of Interior had
even proposed such an interpretation of the Property Clause.
We made clear that "the State is free to enforce its criminal
and civil laws" on federal land so long as those laws do not
conflict with federal law. Ibid. The Property Clause itself
does not automatically conflict with all state regulation of
federal land. Rather, as we explained in Kleppe,
"Absent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains
jurisdiction over federal lands within its territory, but
Congress equally surely retains the power to enact legislation respecting those lands pursuant to the Property
Clause. And when Congress so acts, the federal legislation necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under
the Supremacy Clause." Ibid. at 543 (citations omitted)
(emphasis supplied).
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We agree with Granite Rock that the Property Clause gives
Congress plenary power to legislate the use of the federal
land on which Granite Rock holds its unpatented mining
claim. The question in this case, however, is whether Congress has enacted legislation respecting this federal land that
would preempt any requirement that Granite Rock obtain a
California Coastal Commission permit. To answer this question we follow the preemption analysis by which the Court
has been guided on numerous occasions:
"[S]tate law can be preempted in either of two general
ways. If Congress evidences an intent to occupy a
given field , any state law falling within that field is
preempted. [Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation & Development Comm'n, 461
U. S. 190,] 203-204 [(1983)]; Fidelity Federal Savings &
Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 153 (1982);
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230
(1947). If Congress has not entirely displaced state
regulation over the matter in question, state law is still
preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal
law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both
state and federal law, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc . v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or where the
state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of
the full purposes or· objectives of Congress, Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941)." Silkwood v. KerrMcGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238, 248 (1984)
Granite Rock and the Solicitor General as amicus have
made basically three arguments in support of a finding that
any possible state permit requirement would be preempted.
First, Granite Rock alleges that the federal government's
environmental regulation of unpatented mining claims in national forests demonstrates an intent to preempt any state
regulation. Second, Granite Rock and the Solicitor General
assert that indications that state land use planning over
unpatented mining claims in national forests is preempted
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should lead to the conclusion that the Coastal Commission
permit requirement is preempted. Finally, Granite Rock
and the Solicitor General assert that the CZMA, by excluding
federal lands from its definition of the coastal zone, declared a
legislative intent that federal lands be excluded from all state
coastal zone regulation. We conclude that these federal statutes and regulations do not, either independently or in combination, justify a facial challenge to the Coastal Commission
permit requirement.
Granite Rock concedes that the Mining Act of 1872, as originally passed, expressed no legislative intent on the as yet
rarely contemplated subject of environmental regulation.
Brief for Appellee at 31-32. In 1955, however, Congress
passed the Multiple Use Mining Act, 30 U.S. C. §601, et
seq., which provided that the federal government would
retain and manage the surface resources of subsequently
located unpatented mining claims. 30 U. S. C. § 612(b).
Congress has delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture the
authority to make "rules and regulations" to "regulate the
occupancy and use" of national forests. 16 U. S. C. § 551.
Through this delegation of authority, the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service has promulgated regulations so
that "use of the surface of National Forest System lands" by
those such as Granite Rock, who have unpatented mining
claims authorized by the Mining Act of 1872, "shall be
conducted so as to minimize adverse environmental impacts
on National Forest System surface resources." 36 CFR
§ 228.1, § 228.3(d) (1986). It was pursuant to these regulations that the Forest Service approved the Plan of Operations submitted by Granite Rock. If, as Granite Rock
claims, it is the federal intent that Granite Rock conduct its
mining unhindered by any state environmental regulation,
one would expect to find the expression of this intent in these
Forest Service regulations. As we explained in Hillsborough County v. Automatic Medical Laboratories, Inc.,
- - U. S. - - , - - (1985), it is appropriate to expect an

I'
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administrative regulation to declare any intention to preempt
state law with some specificity:
"[B]ecause agencies normally address problems in a detailed manner and can speak through a variety of means,
. . . we can expect that they will make their intentions
clear if they intend for their regulations to be exclusive.
Thus, if an agency does not speak to the question of preemption, we will pause before saying that the mere volume and complexity of its regulations indicate that the
agency did in fact intend to pre-empt."
Upon examination, however, the Forest Service regulations that Granite Rock alleges preempt any state permit requirement not only are devoid of any expression of intent to
preempt state law, but rather appear to assume that those
submitting plans of operations will comply with state laws.
The regulations explicitly require all operators within the
National Forests to comply with state air quality standards,
36 CFR § 228.8(a) (1986), state water quality standards,
§ 228.8(b), and state standards for the disposal and treatment
of solid wastes, § 228.8(c). The regulations also provide
that, pending final approval of the plan of operations, the
Forest Service officer with authority to approve plans of
operation "will approve such operations as may be necessary
. for timely compliance with the requirements of Federal and
State laws .... " § 228.5(b) (emphasis added). Finally, the
final subsection of § 228.8, "Requirements for environmental
protection," provides:
"(h) Certification or other approval issued by State agencies or other Federal agencies of compliance with laws
and regulations relating to mining operations will be accepted as compliance with similar or parallel requirements of these regulations." (emphasis supplied).
It is impossible to divine from these regulations, which ex-

pressly contemplate coincident compliance with state law as
well as with federal law, an intention to preempt all state
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regulation of unpatented mining claims in national forests.
Neither Granite Rock nor the Solicitor General contends that
these Forest Service regulations are inconsistent with their
authorizing statutes.
Given these Forest Service regulations, it is unsurprising
that the Forest Service team that prepared the Environmental Assessment of Granite Rock's plan of operation, as well as
the Forest Service officer that approved the plan of operation, expected compliance with state as well as federal law.
The Los Padres National Forest Environmental Assessment
of the Granite Rock plan stated that "Granite Rock is responsible for obtaining any necessary permits which may be required by the California Coastal Commission." App. at 46.
The Decision Notice and Finding of No Significant Impact issued by the Acting District Ranger accepted Granite Rock's
plan of operation with modifications, stating:
"The claimant, in exercising his rights granted by the
Mining Law of 1872, shall comply with the regulations of
the Departments of Agriculture and Interior. The
claimant is further responsible for obtaining any necessary permits required by State and/or county laws, regulations and/or ordinance." App. at 54.
The second argument proposed by Granite Rock is that
federal land management statutes demonstrate a legislative
intent to limit states to a purely advisory role in federal land
management decisions, and that the Coastal Commission permit requirement is therefore preempted as an impermissible
state land use regulation.
In 1976 two pieces of legislation were passed that called for
the development of federal land use management plans affecting unpatented mining claims in national forests. Under
the Federal Lands Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43
U. S. C. § 1701 et seq., the Department of Interior's Bureau
of Land Management is responsible for managing the mineral
resources on federal forest lands; under the National Forest
Management Act (NFMA), 16 U. S. C. §§ 1600-1614, the

.

~·'

.

'

1

'!
85-1200-0PINION
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMM'N v. GRANITE ROCK CO.

11

Forest Service under the Secretary of Agriculture is responsible for the management of the surface impacts of mining on
federal forest lands. Granite Rock, as well as the Solicitor
General, point to aspects of these statutes indicating a legislative intent to limit states to an advisory role in federal land
management decisions. For example, the NFMA directs
the Secretary of Agriculture to "develop, maintain, and, as
appropriate, revise land and resource management plans for
units of the National Forest System, coordinated with the
land and resource management planning processes of State
and local governments and other Federal agencies," 16
U. S. C. § 1604(a). The FLPMA directs that land use plans
developed by the Secretary of the Interior "shall be consistent with State and local plans to the maximum extent [the
Secretary] finds consistent with Federal law," and calls for
the Secretary, "to the extent he finds practical," to keep
apprised of state land use plans, and to "assist in resolving, to
the extent practical, inconsistencies between Federal and
non-Federal Government plans." 43 U. S. C. § 1712(c)(9).
We may assume for the purposes of this discussion that the
combination of the NFMA and the FLPMA preempt the extension of state land use plans onto unpatented mining claims
in national forest lands. The Coastal Commission has consistently maintained that it has no authority to prescribe or
prohibit particular uses of national forest lands. The Coastal
Commission insists that the conditions it intends to place on
its permit to Granite Rock will take the form of environmental regulation of the mining operation. The line between
environmental regulation and land use planning will not always be bright; for example, one may hypothesize a state
environmental regulation so severe that a particular land use
would become commercially impracticable. However, the
core activity described by each phrase is undoubtedly different. Land use planning in essence chooses particular uses
for the land; environmental regulation, at its core, does not
mandate particular uses of the land but requires only that,
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however the land is used, damage to the environment is kept
within prescribed limits. Congress has indicated its understanding of land use planning and environmental regulation
as distinct activities.
As noted above, 43 U. S. C.
§ 1712(c)(9) requires that the Secretary of Interior's land use
plans be consistent with state plans only "to the extent practical." The immediately preceding subsection, however, requires that the Secretary's land use plans "provide for compliance with applicable pollution control laws, including State
and Federal air, water, noise, or other pollution standards or
implementation plans." § 1712(c)(8). Congress has also
illustrated its understanding of land use planning and environmental regulation as distinct activities by delegating the
authority to regulate these activities to different agencies.
The stated purpose of Part 228, subpart A of the Forest
Service regulations, 36 CFR § 228.1, is to "set forth rules and
regulations" through which mining on unpatented claims in
national forests "shall be conducted so as to minimize adverse
environmental impacts on National Forest System surface
resources." The next sentence of the subsection, however,
declares that "[i]t is not the purpose of these regulations to
provide for the management of mineral resources; the responsibility for managing such resources is in the Secretary
of the Interior." Congress clearly envisioned that although
environmental regulation and land use planning may hypothetically overlap in some instances, these two types of activity would in most cases be capable of differentiation.
Considering the legislative understanding of environmental
regulation and land use planning as distinct activities, it
would be anomalous to maintain that Congress intended any
state environmental regulation of unpatented mining claims
in national forests to be per se preempted as an impermissible
exercise of state land use planning. Congress' treatment of
environmental regulation and land use planning as generally
distinguishable calls for this Court to treat them as distinct,
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until an actual overlap between the two is demonstrated in a
particular case.
Granite Rock suggests that the Coastal Commission's true
purpose in enforcing a permit requirement is to prohibit
Granite Rock's mining entirely. By choosing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief against the permit requirement
before discovering what conditions the Coastal Commission
would have placed on the permit, Granite Rock has lost the
possibility of making this argument in this litigation. Granite Rock's case must stand or fall on the question whether
any possible set of conditions attached to the Coastal Commission's permit requirement would be preempted. As
noted in the previous section, the Forest Service regulations
do not indicate a federal intent to preempt all state environmental regulation of unpatented mining claims in national forests. Whether or not state land use planning over unpatented mining claims in national forests is preempted, the
Coastal Commission insists that its permit requirement is an
exercise of environmental regulation rather than land use
planning. In the present posture of this litigation, the
Coastal Commission's identification of a possible set of permit
conditions not preempted by federal law is sufficient to rebuff
Granite Rock's facial challenge to the permit requirement.
This analysis is not altered by the fact that the Coastal Commission chooses to impose its environmental regulation by
means of a permit requirement. If the federal government
occupied the field of environmental regulation of unpatented
mining claims in national forests-concededly not the casethen state environmental regulation of Granite Rock's mining
activity would be preempted, whether or not the regulation
was implemented through a permit requirement. Conversely, if reasonable state environmental regulation is not
preempted, then the use of a permit requirement to impose
the state regulation does not create a conflict with federal law
where none previously existed. The permit requirement itself is not talismanic.
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Granite Rock's final argument involves the Coastal Zone
Management Act (CZMA), 16 U. S. C.§ 1451 et seq. , through
which financial assistance is provided to states for the development of coastal zone management programs. Section
304(a) of the CZMA, 16 U. S. C. § 1453(1), defines the coastal
zone of a state, and specifically excludes from the coastal zone
"lands the use of which is by law subject solely to the discretion of or which is held in trust by the Federal Government, its officers or agents." The Department of Commerce, which administers the CZMA, has interpreted
§ 1453(1) to exclude all federally-owned land from the CZMA
definition of a state's coastal zone. 15 CFR § 923.33(a).
Granite Rock argues that the exclusion of "lands the use of
which is by law subject solely to the discretion of or which is
held in trust by the Federal Government, its officers or
agents" excludes all federally-owned land from the CZMA
definition of a state's coastal zone, and demonstrates a congressional intent to preempt any possible Coastal Commission permit requirement as applied to the mining of Granite
Rock's unpatented claim in the national forest land.
According to Granite Rock, because Granite Rock mines
land owned by the federal government, the Coastal Commission's regulation of Granite Rock's mining operation must
be limited to participation in a consistency review process detailed in the CZMA. Under the CZMA, once a state coastal
zone management program has been approved by the Secretary of Commerce for federal administrative grants, "any applicant for a required Federal license or permit to conduct an
activity affecting land or water uses in the coastal zone of
that state shall provide in the application . . . a certification
that the proposed activity complies with the state's approved
program and that such activity will be conducted in a manner
16 U. S. C.
consistent with the [state] program."
§ 1456(c)(3)(A). At the same time, the applicant must provide the state a copy of the certification. The state, after
public notice and appropriate hearings, is to notify the Fed-

I
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eral agency concerned that the state concurs or objects to the
certification. If the state fails to notify the federal agency
within six months of receiving notification, it is presumed
that the state concurs. If the state neither concurs nor is
presumed to concur, the federal agency must reject the application, unless the Secretary of Commerce finds that the
application is consistent with the objectives of the CZMA or
is "otherwise necessary in the interest of national security."
I d.
In order for an activity to be subject to CZMA consistency
review, the activity must be on a list that the state provides
federal agencies, which describes the type of federal permit
and license applications the state wishes to review. 15 CFR
§ 930.53 (1986). If the activity is unlisted, the state must
within 30 days of receiving notice of the federal permit application inform the federal agency and federal permit applicant
that the proposed activity requires CZMA consistency review. 15 CFR §930.54 (1986). If the state does not provide
timely notification, it waives the right to review the unlisted
activity. In the present case, it appears that Granite Rock's
proposed mining operations were not listed pursuant to 15
CFR § 930.53, and that the Coastal Commission did not
timely notify the Forest Service or Granite Rock that Granite
Rock's plan of operations required consistency review. App.
17. Therefore, the Coastal Commission waived its right to
consistency review of the 1981-1986 plan of operations.
Absent any other expression of congressional intent regarding the preemptive effect of the CZMA, we would be required to decide, first, whether unpatented mining claims in
national forests were meant to be excluded from the § 1453(1)
definition of a state's coastal zone, and second, whether this
exclusion from the coastal zone definition was intended to
preempt state regulations that were not preempted by any
other federal statutes or regulations. Congress has provided several clear statements of its intent regarding the
preemptive effect of the CZMA; those statements, which in-
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dicate that Congress clearly intended the CZMA not to be an
independent cause of preemption except in cases of actual
conflict, end our inquiry.
16 U. S. C. § 1456(e)(1) provides:
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed (1) to diminish either Federal or state jurisdiction,
responsibility, or rights in the field of planning, development, or control of water resources, submerged
lands, or navigable waters; nor to displace, supersede,
limit, or modify any interstate compact or the jurisdiction or responsibility of any legally established joint or
common agency of two or more states or of two or more
states and the Federal Government; nor to limit the authority of Congress to authorize and fund projects ... "
The Senate report describes the above section as "a standard
clause disclaiming intent to diminish Federal or State authority in the fields affected by the Act," or "to change interstate
agreements." S. Rep. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 20
(1972). The Conference Report stated, "[t]he Conferees also
adopted language which would make certain that there is no
intent is this legislation to change Federal or State jurisdiction in specified fields, including submerged lands." Conf.
Rep. No. 1544, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1972). While the
land at issue here does not appear to fall under the categories
listed in 16 U. S. C. § 1456(e)(1), the section and its legislative history demonstrate Congress' refusal to use the CZMA
to alter the balance between state and federal jurisdiction.
The clearest statement of congressional intent as to the
preemptive effect of the CZMA appears in the "Purpose" section of the Senate Report, quoted in full:
"[The CZMA] has as its main purpose the encouragement and assistance of States in preparing and implementing management programs to preserve, protect, develop and whenever possible restore the resources of the
coastal zone of the United States. The bill authorizes
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Federal grants-in-aid to coastal states to develop coastal
zone management programs. Additionally, it authorizes grants to help coastal states implement these management programs once approved, and States would be
aided in the acquisition and operation of estuarine
sanctuaries. Through the system of providing grantsin-aid, the States are provided financial incentives to
undertake the responsibility for setting up management
programs in the coastal zone. There is no attempt to
diminis.h state authority through federal preemption.
The intent of this legislation is to enhance state authority
by encouraging and assisting the states to assume planning and regulatory powers over the coastal zones."
S. Rep. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972) (emphasis
supplied).
Because Congress specifically disclaimed any intention to
preempt pre-existing state authority in the CZMA, we conclude that even if all federal lands are excluded from the
CZMA definition of "coastal zone," the CZMA does not automatically preempt all state regulation of activities on federal
lands.
IV
Granite Rock's challenge to the California Coastal Commission's permit requirement was broad and absolute; our rejection of that challenge is correspondingly narrow. Granite
Rock argued that any state permit requirement, whatever its
conditions, was per se preempted by federal law. To defeat
Granite Rock's facial challenge, the Coastal Commission
needed merely to identify a possible set of permit conditions
not in conflict with federal law. The Coastal Commission alleges that it will use its permit requirement to impose reasonable environmental regulation. Rather than evidencing an
intent to preempt such state regulation, the Forest Service
regulations appear to assume compliance with state laws.
Federal land use statutes and regulations, while arguably
expressing an intent to preempt state land use planning, dis-
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tinguish environmental regulation from land use planning.
Finally, the language and legislative history of the CZMA
expressly disclaim an intent to preempt state regulation.
While a fully developed record may demonstrate a conflict
between the Coastal Commission permit requirement and
federal law, the barren record in this case cannot justify a
facial attack on the permit requirement. Consequently, the
Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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Dear Sandra:
I shall wait for the dissent.
Respectfully,

Justice O'Connor
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January 13, 1987
ROCK GINA-POW
85-1200

California

Coastal

Commission

v.

Granite

Rock

Company

MEMO TO RONALD:
Last night I

read the first

draft of a dissent in

this case, and I must say that it leaves me in a state of
considerable confusion.
have

not

found

an

In fairness,

opportunity

to

I should say that I
read

carefully

the

Court's opinion, and I do not have a grasp of the complex
of statutes and regulations that I found to be confusing
in

the

briefs.

It

is

evident

that

you

do

have

the

statutes in mind, and therefore my criticism of your draft
may not be justified.
As I perhaps have said before, I like for a dissent
to

be

"free-standing"

understandable without
opinion.

I

therefore

so

that

simultaneously
would

the

dissent

reading

appreciate

your

the

is
Court

doing

a

second, more carefully framed draft.
It would be helpful at

the outset to summarize what

the Court does decide in Part III, and - at an appropriate
place -

identify the federal statute and regulations upon

2.

~

'I
I

which

the

Court

relies

in

concluding

that

Congress

approved some sort of "dual" regulatory system.
I agree with you that in view of the Property Clause,
there

can

be

no

question

as

to

right

of

Congress

to

exclude states from all participation with respect to the
use of

federal

land.

My understanding is that Congress

has elected to create a regulatory framework under which
the states are invited to submit their objections to the
issuance of a federal permit such as the right to mine in
this case.
dual

system,

But Congress has not explicitly authorized a
and at least

implicitly has made it clear

that although the views of a state must be considered by
federal regulators, the final decisions are made pursuant
to

federal

law.

Any

state

law

to

the

contrary

is

preempted.
I

understand

this

is

the

import

of

your

draft,

although I do not think you have reasoned it out with your
customary care and precision.

I am much impressed by your

mastery of the statutory maze, but find including most of
this

in

three

or

four

long

footnotes

is

confusing.

I

suggest that the most pertinent statutes be identified in
the text, together with any regulations that are directly
pertinent to this case.

After all, this case turns on the

3•

.~

''j
'

I·

extent

to

which

constitutional

power

Congress
to

has

regulate

exercised
federal

its

land

full

without

regard to the views of the states.
There is no urgency about circulating this dissent,
and I know - and appreciate - that you are most generous
in providing assistance to your coclerks in addition to
keeping fully abreast of your own work.

You are the first

law clerk I have had who gave me bench memos for February
arguments before the January arguments commenced.
LFP, JR.
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JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 85-1200, California Coastal Commission
v. Granite Rock Co.

Dear Sandra:
For now, I shall withhold my vote until I have seen
the other writings.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
cc: The Conference
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GRANITEll SALLY-POW
III
In summary, it bears repeating that Congress
properly and carefully has ensured that affected states
must be afforded an opportunity to communicate their
environmental concerns to the federal regulators charged
with deciding how federal lands should be used. 7

It is

fair to say, however, that commencing in 1872 Congress has
created an almost impenetrable maze of arguably relevant
legislation in no less than a half-a-dozen (Ronald, is it
six or seven?) statutes, and these are augmented by the
regulations of two departments of government.

There is

little wonder that confusion exists when one looks only to
the language of these statutes and regulations, and there

.._,?',·

'

~

'

2.

is an evident need for Congress to enact a single
comprehensive statute for the regulation of federal lands.
Having said this, it is at least clear that duplicate
federal and state regulations that could create a conflict
as to which controls would be intolerable.

This being the

case, as I have noted above, in view of the Property
Clause of the Constitution, as well as common sense,
federal authority must control with respect to land
"belonging to the United States."

Yet, the Court's

opinion today, approves a system of duplicate authority
with respect to environmental matters, and accordingly the
net result of today's holding is that state regulators
have the power to forbid activity on federally owned lands
expressly authorized by the Forest Service.

. .

I dissent •

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
J usticf Marshall
J ustie~ Blackmun
Justic~ Stevens
Justice O'Connor
Justice Scalia

01/23
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Justice Powell
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 85-1200
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS v. GRANITE ROCK COMPANY
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[January-, 1987]

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
Because I agree that this case is properly before us, I join
Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. In Part III, the Court
considers a Forest Service permit authorizing Granite Rock
to operate its mine in a national forest. Because I cannot
agree with the Court's conclusion that Congress intended to
allow California to require an additional permit, I dissent
from Part III.
I
A
To understand Part III of the Court's opinion, one must
have some knowledge of two groups of statutes and regulations. The first group of provisions regulates mining. As
the Court explains, the basic source of federal mining law is
the General Mining Law of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (codified
as amended at 30 U. S. C. § 22, et seq.). Ever since the passage of that law, a prominent feature of federal mining policy
has been the strong desire of Congress to make federallyowned mineral resources available for development. See
General Mining Law § 1, 30 U. S. C. § 22. As the demand
for minerals has increased during the past century, Congress
has emphasized that an "economically sound and stable domestic mining ... industr[y]" is important to the economy,
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and to our nation's security. See Mining and Mineral Policy
Act of 1970, § 2, 30 U. S. C. § 21a. 1
In response to the increasing commercial importance of
federal lands, Congress passed the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U. S. C.§ 1701 et seq.
That statute promotes the effective development of federal
lands in two ways. First, it directs the Secretary of the
Interior to inventory the resources located on federal lands
and to develop comprehensive plans for future development.
§ 1701(a)(2). Second, it ensures that the States' interests in
these resources will not be ignored:
"The Secretary shall . . . coordinate [his plans] with the
land use planning and management programs of . . . the
States and local governments within which the lands are
located. . . . Land use plans of the Secretary . . . shall
be consistent with State and local plans to the maximum
extent he finds consistent with Federal law and the purposes of this Act." § 1712(c)(9).
Significantly, the Land Management Act only requires the
Secretary to listen to the States, not obey them. As the
Conference Report explained: "[T]he ultimate decision as to
determining the extent of feasible consistency between [the
Secretary's] plans and [State or local] plans rests with the
Secretary of the Interior." H. R. Conf. Rep. 94-1724, p. 58
(1976).
1

See also National Materials and Mineral Policy, Research and Development Act of 1980, § 2(a)(l), 30 U. S. C. § 1601(a)(l) (congressional finding
that the availability of minerals "is essential for national security, economic
well-being, and industrial production"); § 2(a)(3), 30 U. S. C. § 1601(a)(3)
(Congressional finding that the extraction of minerals is "closely linked
with national concerns for energy and the environment"); § 3, 30 U. S. C.
§ 1602 ("[I]t is the continuing policy of the United States to promote an adequate and stable supply of materials necessary to maintain national security, economic well-being and industrial production with appropriate attention to a long-term balance between resource production, energy use, a
healthy environment, natural resources conservation, and social needs").

•
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B

The second area of federal law important to this case concerns national forests. In the Organic Administration Act of
1897, Congress delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture the
authority to "regulate [the] occupancy and use" of national
forests. 16 U. S. C. § 551. The Forest Service, as the Secretary's delegate, has promulgated regulations to control the
"use" of national forests. The Court, by focusing on the Forest Service's concern for preservation of the national forests,
characterizes these regulations as "environmental" regulations, in its view something entirely different from "land use"
regulations. Ante, at 11-13.
In fact, the regulation of land use is more complicated than
the Court suggests. First, as is true with respect to the
Secretary of Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture has been
directed to develop comprehensive plans for the use of
resources located in national forests. See Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 (Forest
Planning Act) § 3(a), 16 U. S. C. § 1601. The Forest Planning Act initially did not require the Forest Service to consider the views of state regulators. But when Congress
passed the FLPMA in 1976, it also passed the National
Forest Management Act (NFMA), that amended the Forest
Planning Act. Of special importance, § 6(a) of the Forest
Management Act requires the Secretary of Agriculture to coordinate his land management plans "with the land and resource management planning processes of State and local
governments." 16 U. S. C. § 1604(a). Section 14 specifically requires the Secretary of Agriculture to give state governments "adequate notice and an opportunity to comment
upon the formulation of standards, criteria, and guidelines
applicable to Forest Service programs." § 1612(a). Thus, it
is clear that the Secretary of Agriculture has the final authority to determine the best use for federal lands, and that he
must consider the views of state regulators before making a

I

•,
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decision. There is no suggestion in the statute or the legislative history that state regulators should have the final authority in determining how particular federal lands should be
used.
The Forest Service also has a role in implementing the nation's mineral development policy. The Court shrugs off the
importance of this obligation, noting that "the responsibility
for managing [mineral] resources is in the Secretary of the
Interior." Ante, at 12 (quoting 36 CFR §228.1 (1986)). As
a general statement this is true, but it does not mean that the
Forest Service makes its decisions on mining permits in a
vacuum. Instead, it is clear that the Forest Service must
consider the nation's mineral policy whenever it issues a permit. The Organic Administration Act of 1897 makes clear
that the Forest Service must act consistently with the federal
policy of promoting mineral development. Section 1 of that
act precludes the Secretary of Agriculture from taking any
action that would "prohibit any person from entering upon
such national forests for all proper and lawful purposes, including that of prospecting, locating, and developing the mineral resources thereof." 16 U.S. C. §478. 2 Forest Service
materials confirm its duty to balance "[t]he demand for
mineral development . . . against the demand for renewable
resources and the land management agency's responsibility
to reasonably protect the environment. " Forest Service
Minerals Program Handbook preface (1983). See also Forest Service Manual § 2802 (1984) (stating that the Forest
Service's policy is to "[i]ntegrate exploration, development,
and production of energy and other mineral resources . . .
with the use and conservation of other resources to the fullest
extent possible"); 30 U. S. C. § 1602. In sum, although the
2
More recently, congressional solicitude for development of federal
mineral resources led Congress to order the President to "coordinate the
responsible departments and agencies to, among other measures . . . encourage Federal agencies to facilitate availability and development of domestic resources to meet critical materials needs. " 30 U. S. C. § 1602(7).
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Secretary of the Interior has a substantial responsibility for
managing mineral resources, the Forest Service also has a
role in implementing the federal policy favoring development
of minerals situated on public lands.
II
The Court's analysis of this case focuses on selected provisions of the federal statutes and regulations, to the exclusion
of other relevant provisions and the larger regulatory context. First, it examines the Forest Service regulations
themselves, apart from the statutes that authorize them.
Because these regulations explicitly require the federal permits to comply with specified state environmental standards,
the Court assumes that Congress intended to allow State
enforcement of any and all state environmental standards.
Careful comparison of the regulations with the authorizing
statutes casts serious doubt on this conclusion. The regulations specifically require compliance with only three types of
state regulation: air quality, see 36 CFR § 228.8(a) (1986);
water quality, see § 228.8(b); and solid waste disposal, see
§ 228.8(c). But the Court fails to mention that the types of
state regulation preserved by § 228.8 already are preserved
by specific nonpre-emption clauses in other federal statutes.
See 42 U. S. C. § 7418(a) (Clean Air Act requires federal
agencies to comply with analogous state regulations); 33
U. S. C. § 1342(b) (establishing state permit program under
the Clean Water Act); 42 U. S. C. § 6901(a)(4) (States retain
primary responsibility for solid waste disposal). The Forest
Service's specific preservation of certain types of state regulation-already preserved by federal law-hardly suggests
an implicit intent to allow the States to apply other types of
regulation to activities on federal lands. Indeed the maxim
expressio unius, exclusio alterius suggests the contrary. 3
3

The Court rests this part of its pre-emption analysis on Hillsborough
County v. Automated Medical Laboratories , Inc., 471 U. S. 707 (1985).
In that case, the Court stated: "[W]e will pause before saying that the

,.,. ~
''j

'
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The second part of the Court's analysis considers both the
NFMA and the FLPMA. The Court assumes, ante, at 11,
that these statutes "pre-empt the extension of state land use
plans onto unpatented mining claims in national forest lands."
But the Court nevertheless holds that the Coastal Commission can require Granite Rock to secure a state permit before
conducting mining operations in a national forest. This conclusion rests on a distinction between "land use planning"
and "environmental regulation." In the Court's view, the
NFMA and the FLPMA indicate a congressional intent to
pre-empt state land use regulations, but not state environmental regulations. I find this analysis unsupportable,
either as an interpretation of the governing statutes or as a
matter of logic.
The basis for the alleged distinction is that Congress has
understood land use planning and environmental regulation
to be distinct activities. The only statute cited for this proposition is § 202(c)(8) of the FLPMA, 43 U. S. C. § 1712(c)(8),
that requires the Secretary of the Interior's land use plans to
"provide for compliance with applicable pollution control
laws, including State and Federal air, water, noise, or other
pollution standards or implementation plans." But this statute provides little support for the majority's analysis. A
mere volume and complexity of [an agency's] regulations indicate that the
agency did in fact intend to pre-empt." Id ., at 718. Hillsborough, however, is quite different from this case. First, the state regulations were
designed to ensure the health of plasma donors, an aim entirely separate
from the aim of the federal regulations, to ensure the purity of the donated
plasma. In this case, by contrast, federal authorities already have considered the environmental effects of Granite Rock's mine. The California
Coastal Commission seeks only to reconsider the decision of the federal authorities. In any event, the argument for pre-emption in this case does
not rest on the Forest Service regulations alone, but also on the comprehensive regulatory system enacted by Congress. The Court cannot make
Hillsborough controlling simply by considering the regulations separately
from their statutory source. As I explain, infra, at pp. 9-11, the complex
of applicable statutes and regulations, considered as a whole, pre-empts
the Coastal Commission's permit requirement.

'.
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section mandating consideration of environmental standards
in the formulation of land use plans does not demonstrate a
general separation between "land use planning" and "environmental regulation." Rather, § 202(c)(8) recognizes that
the Secretary's land use planning will affect the environment,
and thus directs the Secretary to comply with certain pollution standards.
Nor does this section support the Court's ultimate conclusion, that Congress intended the Secretary's plans to comply
with all state environmental regulations. As I have explained above, supra, at 5, other federal statutes require
compliance with the listed standards.4 Also, because the
FLPMA requires compliance only with "applicable" standards, it is difficult to treat this one section as an independent
and controlling command that the Secretary comply with all
state environmental standards. Rather, viewing the complex of statutes and regulations as a whole, it is reasonable to
view § 202(c)(8) simply as a recognition that the Secretary's
plans must comply with standards made applicable to federal
activities by other federal laws.
The only other authority cited by the Court for the distinction between envionmental regulation and land use planning
is a Forest Service regulation stating that the Forest Service's rules do not "provide for the management of mineral
resources ," 36 CFR § 228.1 (1986). From this, the Court
concludes that the Forest Service enforces environmental
• The Forest Service regulations discussed above mention a slightly different set of environmental standards than does the FLPMA. Both provisions specifically preserve air and water standards. The Forest Service
regulations also mention solid waste disposal standards; the Land Management Act also mentions noise control standards. Cf. 42 U. S. C.
§ 4901(a)(3) (Noise Control Act provision stating that the "primary responsibility for control of noise rests with State and local governments"). The
slight difference between the two lists of pollution standards, however, is
insignificant. The feature that all the listed standards have in common is
that other federal statutes specifically preserve a place for state regulation. See supra, at 5.

85-1200-CONCUR/DISSENT
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMM'N v. GRANITE ROCK CO.

8

regulation but does not engage in land use planning. This
conclusion ignores the Forest Planning Act and the NFMA,
that direct the Secretary of Agriculture and the Forest
Service to develop comprehensive plans for the "use" of
federally-owned forest land resources. As the Court acknowledges, these statutes make the Forest Service "responsible for the management of the surface impacts of mining on
federal forest lands." Ante, at 11. But the Court finds no
significance in this mandate, just as it finds no significance in
the Organic Administration Act's command to the Secretary
of Agriculture to promulgate regulations governing the
"occupancy and use" of national forests, 16 U. S. C. § 551.
These regulations are integral to the Forest Service's management of national forests. To view them as limited to
environmental concerns ignores both the Forest Service's
broader responsibility to manage the use of forest resources
and the federal policy of making mineral resources accessible
to development. 5
The lack of statutory support for the Court's distinction is not surprising, because-with all respect-it seems to me that the distinction is one
without a rational difference. As the Court puts it: "Land use planning in
essence chooses particular uses for the land; environmental regulation, at
its core, does not mandate particular uses of the land but requires only
that, however the land is used, damage to the environment is kept within
prescribed limits." Ante, at 11-12. This explanation separates one of the
reasons for Forest Service decisions from the decisions themselves. In
considering a proposed use of a parcel of land in the national forest, the
Forest Service regulations consider the damage the use will cause to the
environment as well as the federal interest in making resources on public
lands accessible to development. The Forest Service may decide that the
proposed use is appropriate, that it is inappropriate, or that it would be
appropriate only if further steps are taken to protect the environment.
The Court divides this decision into two distinct types of regulation and
holds that Congress intended to preempt duplicative state regulation of
one part but not the other. Common sense suggests that it would be best
for one expert federal agency, the Forest Service, to consider all these factors and decide what use best furthers the relevant federal policies.
6

; '
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The most troubling feature of the Court's analysis is that it
is divorced from the realities of its holding. The Court cautions that its decision allows only "reasonable" environmental
regulation and that it does not give the Coastal Commission a
veto over Granite Rock's mining activities. But if the
Coastal Commission can require Granite Rock to secure a
permit before allowing mining operations to proceed, it necessarily can forbid Granite Rock from conducting these operations. It may be that reasonable environmental regulations
would not force Granite Rock to close its mine. This misses
the point. The troubling fact is that the Court has given a
state authority-here the Coastal Commission-the power to
prohibit Granite Rock from exercising the rights granted by
its Forest Service permit. This abdication of federal control
over the use of federal land is unprecedented. 6

III
Apart from my disagreement with the Court's characterization of the governing statutes, its pre-emption analysis
accords little or no weight to both the location of the mine in a
national forest, and the comprehensive nature of the federal
statutes that authorized Granite Rock's federal permit.
One important factor in pre-emption analysis is the relative
weight of the state and federal interests in regulating a particular matter. Cf. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 66-69
(1941). The Court recognizes that the mine in this case is
located in a national forest, but curiously attaches no significance to that fact. The Property Clause specifically grants
Congress "Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States." U.S. Const., Art. IV, §3,
cl. 2. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243
U. S. 389, 404 (1917). This provision may not of its own
6

I express no view as to the Court's conclusion that the Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972, 16 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq., does not pre-empt the
state regulation in this case. See ante, at 14-17.
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force pre-empt the authority of a State to regulate activities
on federal land, but it clearly empowers Congress to limit the
extent to which a State may regulate in this area. Accordingly, once Congress acts with respect to such activities, duplicative state regulations are pre-empted unless Congress
unambigously has expressed an intent to allow the States to
share regulatory authority. The Court's opinion identifies
no such expression of Congressional intent.
The state regulation in this case is particularly intrusive
because it takes the form of a separate, and duplicative, permit system. As the Court has recognized, state permit requirements are especially likely to intrude on parallel federal
authority, because they effectively giye the State the power
to veto the federal project. See International Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, --U.S. - - , - - (1987); First Iowa HydroElectric Cooperative v. FPC, 328 U. S. 152, 164 (1946). Although the intrusive effect of duplicative state permit systems may not lead to a finding of pre-emption in all cases, it
certainly is relevant to a careful pre-emptidn analysis.
The dangers of duplicative permit requirements are evident in this case. The federal permit system reflects a careful balance between two important federal interests: the interest in developing mineral resources on federal land, and
the interest in protecting our national forests from environmental harm. The Forest Service's issuance of a permit to
Granite Rock reflects its conclusion that environmental concerns associated with Granite Rock's mine do not justify restricting mineral development on this portion of a Federal
Forest. Allowing the Coastal Commission to strike a different balance necessarily conflicts with the federal system.
Furthermore, as discussed supra, at 2-4, Congress already
has provided that affected States must be afforded an opportunity to communicate their concerns to the federal regulators charged with deciding how federal lands should be

• IJ, ~.
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used. 7 Because Congress has ensured that any federal decision will reflect the environmental concerns of affected
States, a duplicative system of permits would serve no purpose. Indeed, the potential for conflict between state and
federal decisions has obvious disadvantages.
IV
In summary, it is fair to say that, commencing in 1872,
Congress has created an almost impenetrable maze of arguably relevant legislation in no less than a half-dozen statutes,
augmented by the regulations of two Departments of the Executive. There is little cause for wonder that the language
of these statutes and regulations has generated considerable
confusion. There is an evident need for Congress to enact a
single, comprehensive statute for the regulation of federal
lands.
7
The discussion in Part I deals primarily with the FLPMA and the
NFMA. In this case, the Coastal Commission actually had yet another
statutory basis for influencing the federal decisionmaking process. Because Granite Rock's mine is near the California Coast, the Coastal Commission has a right to consistency review under the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA). Thus, if the Coastal Commission had voiced its
concerns, the Secretary could not have approved this permit unless he determined, after a hearing, "that the activity is consistent with the objectives of [the CZMA] or is otherwise necessary in the interest of national
security." 16 U. S. C. § 1456(c)(3)(A). Although the Coastal Commission
had notice of Granite Rock's application to the Forest Service, it did not
object to Granite Rock's activities until two years after the application was
approved and Granite Rock began mining pursuant to the federal permit.
Because the Coastal Commission failed to make a timely complaint to the
Forest Service, it forfeited its right to consistency review under the
CZMA.
By noting the provision for consistency review, I do not imply that the
CZMA itself pre-empts the Coastal Commission's permit requirement.
See n. 6, supra. I believe, however, that the provision for consistency
review, considered with the other specific provisions for state participation
in the federal regulatory process, indicates that Congress did not believe
the States could have imposed separate permit requirements, even before
passage of the CZMA.

...
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Having said this, it is at least clear that duplicative federal
and state permit requirements create an intolerable conflict
in decisionmaking. In view of the Property Clause of the
Constitution, as well as common sense, federal authority
must control with respect to land "belonging to the United
States." Yet, the Court's opinion today approves a system
of twofold authority with respect to environmental matters.
The result of this holding is that state regulators, whose
views on environmental and mineral policy may conflict with
the views of the Forest Service, have the power, with respect to federal lands, to forbid activity expressly authorized
by the Forest Service. I dissent.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justife Blackmun
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
Justice Scalia
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2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85- 1200

CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS v. GRANITE ROCK COMPANY
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[February -

, 1987]

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
Because I agree that this case is properly before us, I join
Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. In Part III, the Court
considers the Forest Service's approval of Granite Rock's \
plan to operate its mine in a national forest. Because I cannot agree with the Court's conclusion that Congress intended
to allow California to require a State permit, I dissent from l
Part III.
I
A
To understand Part III of the Court's opinion, one must
have some knowledge of two groups of statutes and regulations. The first group of provisions regulates mining. As
the Court explains, the basic source of federal mining law is
the General Mining Law of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (codified
as amended at 30 U. S. C. § 22, et seq.). In general, that law
opens the public lands to exploration. If one discovers valuable mineral deposits, the statute grants him the right to
extract and sell the minerals without paying a royalty to the
United States, as well as the right-subject to certain statutory requirements-to obtain fee title to the land. See General Mining Law§ 1, 30 U. S. C. § 22; United States v. Locke,
471 U. S. 84, 86 (1968). As the demand for minerals has

..,
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increased during the past century, Congress has emphasized
that an "economically sound and stable domestic mining . . .
industr[y]" is important to the economy, and to our nation's
security. See Mining and Mineral Policy Act of 1970, § 2, 30
U. S.C. §21a. 1
B

The second area of federal law important to this case concerns the management of federal lands. In response to the
increasing commercial importance of federal lands, as well as
the awareness of the environmental values of these lands,
Congress passed the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U. S. C. § 1701 et seq. That statute promotes the effective development of federal lands in
two ways pertinent to this case. First, it directs the Secretary of the Interior to inventory the resources located on
federal lands and to develop comprehensive plans for future
development. §§ 1701(a)(2), 1711, 1712. Second, it ensures
that the States' interests in these resources will not be
ignored:
"The Secretary shall ... coordinate [his plans] with the
land use planning and management programs of . . . the
States and local governments within which the lands are
located. . . . Land use plans of the Secretary . . . shall
be consistent with State and local plans to the maximum
extent he finds consistent with Federal law and the purposes of this Act." § 1712(c)(9).
' See also National Materials and Mineral Policy, Research and Development Act of 1980, § 2(a)(1), 30 U. S. C. § 1601(a)(1) (congressional finding
that the availability of minerals "is essential for national security, economic
well-being, and industrial production"); § 2(a)(3), 30 U. S. C. § 1601(a)(3)
(Congressional finding that the extraction of minerals is "closely linked
with national concerns for energy and the environment"); § 3, 30 U. S. C.
§ 1602 ("[I]t is the continuing policy of the United States to promote an adequate and stable supply of materials necessary to maintain national security, economic well-being and industrial production with appropriate attention to a long-term balance between resource production, energy use, a
healthy environment, natural resources conservation, and social needs").
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Significantly, the Land Management Act only requires the
Secretary to listen to the States, not obey them. As the
Conference Report explained: "[T]he ultimate decision as to
determining the extent of feasible consistency between [the
Secretary's] plans and [State or local] plans rests with the
Secretary of the Interior." H. R. Conf. Rep. 94-1724, p. 58
(1976).
The surface management provisions of the FLPMA do not
apply to National Forest lands. 43 CFR § 3809.0-5(c) (1985).
Congress first provided for management of these lands in the
Organic Administration Act of 1897, that delegated to the
Secretary of Agriculture the authority to "regulate [the] occupancy and use" of national forests. 16 U. S. C. § 551.
The Forest Service, as the Secretary's delegate, has promulgated regulations to control the "use" of national forests.
36 CFR § 228.1 et seq. (1986). Persons wishing to mine in
the National Forests submit plans of operation detailing their
anticipated activities. If the Forest Service determines that
the plans comply with the regulations, it approves them and
authorizes the mining operation. The Court, by focusing on
the Forest Service's concern for preservation of the national
forests, characterizes these regulations as "environmental"
regulations, in its view something entirely different from
"land use" regulations. Ante, at 11-13.
In fact, the regulation of land use is more complicated than
the Court suggests. First, as is true with respect to the
Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture has
been directed to develop comprehensive plans for the use of
resources located in national forests. See Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 (Forest
Planning Act) § 3(a), 16 U. S. C. § 1601. The Forest Planning Act initially did not require the Forest Service to
consider the views of state regulators. But when Congress
passed the FLPMA in 1976, it also passed the National
Forest Management Act (NFMA), that amended the Forest
Planning Act. Of special importance, § 6(a) of the Forest
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Management Act requires the Secretary of Agriculture to
coordinate his land management plans "with the land and
resource management planning processes of State and local
governments." 16 U. S. C. § 1604(a). Section 14 specifically requires the Secretary of Agriculture to give state governments "adequate notice and an opportunity to comment
upon the formulation of standards, criteria, and guidelines
applicable to Forest Service programs." § 1612(a). Thus, it
is clear that the Secretary of Agriculture has the final authority to determine the best use for federal lands, and that he
must consider the views of state regulators before making a
decision. There is no suggestion in the statute or the legislative history that state regulators should have the final authority in determining how particular federal lands should be
used.
The Forest Service also has a role in implementing the nation's mineral development policy. The Court shrugs off the
importance of this obligation, noting that "the responsibility
for managing [mineral] resources is in the Secretary of the
Interior." Ante, at 12 (quoting 36 CFR § 228.1 (1986)).
This statement erroneously equates mineral resources management with land use management. Title 43 of the Code of
Federal Regulations details the activities of the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) in this context. Generally, BLM
manages the process by which rights to minerals are obtained
from the United States and protected against others, the
payment of royalties to the Federal Government, and the
conservation of the minerals themselves. In some caseslike oil, gas, and coal-BLM supervises leasing of the right to
extract the materials. But this case involves "hardrock"
minerals governed by the Mining Act of 1872. With respect
to those minerals, the BLM's actions are limited to determining whether the land is subject to location under the mining
laws; whether a mining claim is properly located and recorded; whether assessment work is properly performed; and
whether the requirements for patenting a claim have been

.. ',..
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complied with. See 43 CFR Parts 3800-3870 (1985). None
of these determinations is a "land use" determination in the
sense of balancing mineral development against environmental hazard to surface resources. The Forest Service makes
these determinations through its review of a mining plan of
operation.
The Organic Administration Act of 1897 makes clear that
the Forest Service must act consistently with the federal policy of promoting mineral development. Section 1 of that act
precludes the Secretary of Agriculture from taking any action that would "prohibit any person from entering upon such
national forests for all proper and lawful purposes, including
that of prospecting, locating, and developing the mineral resources thereof." 16 U. S. C. §478. 2 Forest Service
materials confirm its duty to balance "[t]he demand for
mineral development ... against the demand for renewable
resources and the land management agency's responsibility
to reasonably protect the environment." Forest Service
Minerals Program Handbook preface (1983). See also Forest Service Manual § 2802 (1984) (stating that the Forest
Service's policy is to "[i]ntegrate exploration, development,
and production of energy and other mineral resources . . .
with the use and conservation of other resources to the fullest
extent possible"); 30 U. S. C. § 1602. In sum, although the
Secretary of the Interior has a substantial responsibility for
managing mineral resources, Congress has entrusted the ·
task of balancing mineral development and environmental
protection in the National Forests to the Department of
Agriculture, and its delegate the Forest Service.
2

More recently, congressional solicitude for development of federal
mineral resources led Congress to order the President to "coordinate the
responsible departments and agencies to, among other measures ...
encourage Federal agencies to facilitate availability and development of
domestic resources to meet critical materials needs. " 30 U. S. C.
§ 1602(7).

.~
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II
The Court's analysis of this case focuses on selected provisions of the federal statutes and regulations, to the exclusion
of other relevant provisions and the larger regulatory context. First, it examines the Forest Service regulations
themselves, apart from the statutes that authorize them.
Because these regulations explicitly require the federal permits to comply with specified state environmental standards,
the Court assumes that Congress intended to allow State
enforcement of any and all state environmental standards.
Careful comparison of the regulations with the authorizing
statutes casts serious doubt on this conclusion. The regulations specifically require compliance with only three types of
state regulation: air quality, see 36 CFR § 228.8(a) (1986);
water quality, see § 228.8(b); and solid waste disposal, see
§ 228.8(c). But the Court fails to mention that the types of
state regulation preserved by § 228.8 already are preserved
by specific nonpre-emption clauses in other federal statutes.
See 42 U. S. C. § 7418(a) (Clean Air Act requires federal
agencies to comply with analogous state regulations); 33
U. S. C. § 1323(a) (similar provision of the Clean Water Act); '
42 U. S. C. § 6961 (similar provision of the Solid Waste Disposal Act). The Forest Service's specific preservation of
certain types of state regulation-already preserved by federal law-hardly suggests an implicit intent to allow the
States to apply other types of regulation to activities on
federal lands. Indeed the maxim expressio unius, exclusio
alterius suggests the contrary. 3
The Court rests this part of its pre-emption analysis on Hillsborough
County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707 (1985).
In that case, the Court stated: "[W]e will pause before saying that the
mere volume and complexity of [an agency's] regulations indicate that the
agency did in fact intend to pre-empt." ld., at 718. Hillsborough, however, is quite different from this case. First, the state regulations were
designed to ensure the health of plasma donors, an aim entirely separate
from the aim of the federal regulations, to ensure the purity of the donated
plasma. In this case, by contrast, federal authorities already have consid3
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The second part of the Court's analysis considers both the
NFMA and the FLPMA. The Court assumes, ante, at 11,
that these statutes "pre-empt the extension of state land use
plans onto unpatented mining claims in national forest lands."
But the Court nevertheless holds that the Coastal Commission can require Granite Rock to secure a state permit before
conducting mining operations in a national forest. This conclusion rests on a distinction between "land use planning"
and "environmental regulation." In the Court's view, the
NFMA and the FLPMA indicate a congressional intent to
pre-empt state land use regulations, but not state environmental regulations. I find this analysis unsupportable,
either as an interpretation of the governing statutes or as a
matter of logic.
The basis for the alleged distinction is that Congress has
understood land use planning and environmental regulation
to be distinct activities. The only statute cited for this proposition is § 202(c)(8) of the FLPMA, 43 U. S. C. § 1712(c)(8),
that requires the Secretary of the Interior's land use plans to
"provide for compliance with applicable pollution control
laws, including State and Federal air, water, noise, or other
pollution standards or implementation plans." But this statute provides little support for the majority's analysis. A
section mandating consideration of environmental standards
in the formulation of land use plans does not demonstrate a
general separation between "land use planning" and "environmental regulation." Rather, § 202(c)(8) recognizes that
the Secretary's land use planning will affect the environment,
ered the environmental effects of Granite Rock's mine. The California
Coastal Commission seeks only to reconsider the decision of the federal authorities. In any event, the argument for pre-emption in this case does
not rest on the Forest Service regulations alone, but also on the comprehensive regulatory system enacted by Congress. The Court cannot make
Hillsborough controlling simply by considering the regulations separately
from their statutory source. As I explain, infra, at pp. 9-11 , the complex
of applicable statutes and regulations, considered as a whole, pre-empts
the Coastal Commission's permit requirement.
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and thus directs the Secretary to comply with certain pollution standards.
Nor does this section support the Court's ultimate conclusion, that Congress intended the Secretary's plans to comply
with all state environmental regulations. As I have explained above, supra, at 5, other federal statutes require
compliance with the listed standards. 4 Also, because the
FLPMA requires compliance only with "applicable" standards, it is difficult to treat this one section as an independent
and controlling command that the Secretary comply with all
state environmental standards. Rather, viewing the complex of statutes and regulations as a whole, it is reasonable to
view § 202(c)(8) simply as a recognition that the Secretary's
plans must comply with standards made applicable to federal
activities by other federal laws.
The only other authority cited by the Court for the distinction between environmental regulation and land use planning
is a Forest Service regulation stating that the Forest Service's rules do not "provide for the management of mineral
resources," 36 CFR § 228.1 (1986). From this, the Court
concludes that the Forest Service enforces environmental
regulation but does not engage in land use planning. This
conclusion misunderstands the division of authority between
the BLM and the Forest Service. As explained above,
supra, at 4-5, the BLM's management of minerals does not
entail management of surface resources or the evaluation of
4
The Forest Service regulations discussed above mention a slightly different set of environmental standards than does the FLPMA. Both provisions specifically preserve air and water standards. The Forest Service
regulations also mention solid waste disposal standards; the Land Management Act also mentions noise control standards. Cf. 42 U. S. C.
§ 4901(a)(3) (Noise Control Act provision stating that the "primary responsibility for control of noise rests with State and local governments"). The
slight difference between the two lists of pollution standards, however, is
insignificant. The feature that all the listed standards have in common is
that other federal statutes specifically preserve a place for state regulation. See supra, at 5.
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surface impacts. As the Court acknowledges, it is the Forest Service that is "responsible for the management of the
surface impacts of mining on federal forest lands." Ante, at
11. The Forest Planning Act and the NFMA direct the Secretary of Agriculture and the Forest Service to develop comprehensive plans for the use of forest resources. Similarly,
the Organic Administration Act commands the Secretary of
Agriculture to promulgate regulations governing the "occupancy and use" of national forests, 16 U. S. C. § 551. These
regulations are integral to the Forest Service's management
of national forests. To view them as limited to environmental concerns ignores both the Forest Service's broader responsibility to manage the use of forest resources and the
federal policy of making mineral resources accessible to
development. 5 The Coastal Commission has no interest in
the matters within the jurisdiction of the BLM; the regulations that it seeks to impose concern matters wholly within
the control of the Forest Service. Thus, this regulation does
The lack of statutory support for the Court's distinction is not surprising, because-with all respect-it seems to me that the distinction is one
without a rational difference. As the Court puts it: "Land use planning in
essence chooses particular uses for the land; environmental regulation, at
its core, does not mandate particular uses of the land but requires only
that, however the land is used, damage to the environment is kept within
prescribed limits." Ante, at 11-12. This explanation separates one of the
reasons for Forest Service decisions from the decisions themselves. In
considering a proposed use of a parcel of land in the national forest , the
Forest Service regulations consider the damage the use will cause to the
environment as well as the federal interest in making resources on public
lands accessible to development. The Forest Service may decide that the
proposed use is appropriate, that it is inappropriate, or that it would be
appropriate only if further steps are taken to protect the environment.
The Court divides this decision into two distinct types of regulation and
holds that Congress intended to preempt duplicative state regulation of
one part but not the other. Common sense suggests that it would be best
for one expert federal agency, the Forest Service, to consider all these
factors and decide what use best furthers the relevant federal policies.
6

~
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not support the Court's distinction between environmental \
regulation and land use planning.
The most troubling feature of the Court's analysis is that it
is divorced from the realities of its holding. The Court cautions that its decision allows only "reasonable" environmental
regulation and that it does not give the Coastal Commission a
veto over Granite Rock's mining activities. But if the
Coastal Commission can require Granite Rock to secure a
permit before allowing mining operations to proceed, it necessarily can forbid Granite Rock from conducting these operations. It may be that reasonable environmental regulations
would not force Granite Rock to close its mine. This misses
the point. The troubling fact is that the Court has given a
state authority-here the Coastal Commission-the power to
prohibit Granite Rock from exercising the rights granted by
its Forest Service permit. This abdication of federal control
over the use of federal land is unprecedented. 6

III
Apart from my disagreement with the Court's characterization of the governing statutes, its pre-emption analysis
accords little or no weight to both the location of the mine in a
national forest, and the comprehensive nature of the federal
statutes that authorized Granite Rock's federal permit.
One important factor in pre-emption analysis is the relative
weight of the state and federal interests in regulating a particular matter. Cf. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 66-69
(1941). The Court recognizes that the mine in this case is
located in a national forest, but curiously attaches no significance to that fact. The Property Clause specifically grants
Congress "Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States." U. S. Const., Art. IV, §3,
I express no view as to the Court's conclusion that the Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972, 16 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq., does not pre-empt the
state regulation in this case. See ante, at 14-17.
6

~
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cl. 2. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243
U. S. 389, 404 (1917). This provision may not of its own
force pre-empt the authority of a State to regulate activities
on federal land, but it clearly empowers Congress to limit the
extent to which a State may regulate in this area. In light of (
this clear constitutional allocation of power, the location of
the mine in a national forest should make us less reluctant to
find pre-emption than we are in other contexts.
The state regulation in this case is particularly intrusive
because it takes the form of a se~arate, and duplicative, permit system. As the Court has recognized, state permit requirements are especially likely to intrude on parallel federal
authority, because they effectively give the State the power
to veto the federal project. See International Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, - - U. S. - - , - - (1987); First Iowa HydroElectric Cooperative v. FPC, 328 U. S. 152, 164 (1946). Although the intrusive effect of duplicative state permit systems may not lead to a finding of pre-emption in all cases, it
certainly is relevant to a careful pre-emption analysis.
The dangers of duplicative permit requirements are evident in this case. The federal permit system reflects a careful balance between two important federal interests: the interest in developing mineral resources on federal land, and
the interest in protecting our national forests from environmental harm. The Forest Service's issuance of a permit to
Granite Rock reflects its conclusion that environmental concerns associated with Granite Rock's mine do not justify restricting mineral development on this portion of a Federal
Forest. Allowing the Coastal Commission to strike a different balance necessarily conflicts with the federal system.
Furthermore, as discussed supra, at 2-4, Congress already
has provided that affected States must be afforded an opportunity to communicate their concerns to the federal regulators charged with deciding how federal lands should be

~
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used. 7 Because Congress has ensured that any federal decision will reflect the environmental concerns of affected
States, a duplicative system of permits would serve no purpose. Indeed, the potential for conflict between state and
federal decisions has obvious disadvantages.
IV
In summary, it is fair to say that, commencing in 1872,
Congress has created an almost impenetrable maze of arguably relevant legislation in no less than a half-dozen statutes,
augmented by the regulations of two Departments of the Executive. There is little cause for wonder that the language
of these statutes and regulations has generated considerable
confusion. There is an evident need for Congress to enact a
single, comprehensive statute for the regulation of federal
lands.
7

The discussion in Part I deals primarily with the FLPMA and the
NFMA. In this case, the Coastal Commission actually had yet another
statutory basis for influencing the federal decisionmaking process.
Because Granite Rock's mine is near the California Coast, the Coastal
Commission has a right to consistency review under the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA). Thus, if the Coastal Commission had
voiced its concerns, the Secretary could not have approved this permit unless he determined, after a hearing, "that the activity is consistent with the
objectives of [the CZMA] or is otherwise necessary in the interest of national security." 16 U. S. C. § 1456(c)(3)(A). Although the Coastal Commission had notice of Granite Rock's application to the Forest Service, it
did not object to Granite Rock's activities until two years after the application was approved and Granite Rock began mining pursuant to the federal
permit. Because the Coastal Commission failed to make a timely complaint to the Forest Service, it forfeited its right to consistency review
under the CZMA.
By noting the provision for consistency review, I do not imply that the
CZMA itself pre-empts the Coastal Commission's permit requirement.
See n. 6, supra. I believe, however, that the provision for consistency
review, considered with the other specific provisions for state participation
in the federal regulatory process, indicates that Congress did not believe
the States could have imposed separate permit requirements, even before
passage of the CZMA .

...

85-1200-CONCUR/DISSENT
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMM'N v. GRANITE ROCK CO.

13

Having said this, it is at least clear that duplicative federal
and state permit requirements create an intolerable conflict
in decisionmaking. 8 In view of the Property Clause of the
· Constitution, as well as common sense, federal authority
must control with respect to land "belonging to the United
States." Yet, the Court's opinion today approves a system
of twofold authority with respect to environmental matters.
The result of this holding is that state regulators, whose
views on environmental and mineral policy may conflict with
the views of the Forest Service, have the power, with respect to federal lands, to forbid activity expressly authorized
by the Forest Service. I dissent.

8
The Court concludes that Granite Rock has failed to demonstrate a
conflict because it rejects my conclusion that land use regulation and environmental regulation are indistinguishable and because it sees no harm in
allowing state permit requirements to supersede the decisions of federal
officials. Ante, at 18.

~u:puntt <lf~tud

ltf t4t ~h .Statts
'mas ftitt:ghtn. ~.
2ll&i'l?

ar.

CHAMI!!lERS 01'"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

February 2, 1987

Re:

No. 85-1200-California Coastal Commission v.
Granite Rock Company

Dear Sandra:
Please join me.
Sincerely,
<:!ft/tf
. .

T.M.

Justice O'Connor
cc: The Conference

rjm 02/02/87

To:
From:
Re:
Co.

Justice Powell
Ronald
No. 85-1200, California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock

JUSTICE SCALIA has filed a separate dissent in this case.
His theory is that, as a matter of state law, the Coastal Commission only has land use authority.
Thus, he rejects the Court's
conclusion that the Coastal Commission permit can be required
under the State's power to regulate environmental rna tters.
I
recommend that you not join JUSTICE SCALIA's opinion. I do agree
that his is the most natural reading of California law.
But I
would be reluctant to rest a decision in this case on this
Court's rejection of a state agency's interpretation of the state
organic statute. Thus, I recommend that you take no action.
I note that there is little in JUSTICE SCALIA's opinion that
ould preclude him from joining your dissent.
I am disappointed
hat he did not consider doing so.
'

~upunu <!fourlof

tl£t ~ttiub ~bdtg

...ag.£rin:ghnt. ~.<!f. 2ll~~~
C HAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

February 4, 1987

Re:

85-1200 - California Coastal
Commission v. Granite Rock

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice ¥arshall
Justice •~lackmun
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
Justice Scalia

02/05

...

From:

Justice Powell

Circulated:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated:_
F_EB_ S-----'= -----'--3rd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-1200
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS v. GRANITE ROCK COMPANY
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[February -

, 1987]

JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, \
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Because I agree that this case is properly before us, I join
Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. In Part III, the Court
considers the Forest Service's approval of Granite Rock's
plan to operate its mine in a national forest. Because I cannot agree with the Court's conclusion that Congress intended
to allow California to require a state permit, I dissent from
Part III.
I
A
To understand Part III of the Court's opinion, one must
have some knowledge of two groups of statutes and regulations. The first group of provisions regulates mining. As
the Court explains, the basic source of federal mining law is
the Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (codified, as
amended, at 30 U. S. C. § 22 et seq.). In general, that law
opens the public lands to exploration. If one discovers valuable mineral deposits, the statute grants him the right to
extract and sell the minerals without paying a royalty to the
United States, as well as the right-subject to certain statutory requirements-to obtain fee title to the land. See Mining Act § 1, 30 U. S. C. § 22; United States v. Locke, 471
U. S. 84, 86 (1985). As the demand for minerals has in-
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creased during the past century, Congress has emphasized
that an "economically sound and stable domestic mining . . .
industr[y]" is important to the economy, and to our Nation's
security. See Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970, § 2, 30
U. S.C. §21a. 1
B
The second area of federal law important to this case concerns the management of federal lands. In response to the
increasing commercial importance of federal lands, as well as
the awareness of the environmental values of these lands,
Congress passed the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S. C.§ 1701 et seq. (1982 ed. and
Supp. III). That statute promotes the effective development of federal lands in two ways pertinent to this case.
First, it directs the Secretary of the Interior to inventory the
resources located on federal lands and to develop comprehensive plans for future development. §§ 1701(a)(2), 1711, 1712.
Second, it ensures that the States' interests in these resources will not be ignored:
"[T]he Secretary shall ... coordinate [his plans] with the
land use planning and management programs of ... the
States and local governments within which the lands are
located. . . . Land use plans of the Secretary . . . shall
be consistent with State and local plans to the maximum
'See also National Materials and Minerals Policy, Research and Development Act of 1980, § 2(a)(l), 30 U. S. C. § 1601(a)(l) (congressional finding that the availability of minerals "is essential for national security, economic well-being, and industrial production"); § 2(a)(3), 30 U. S. C.
§ 1601(a)(3) (Congressional finding that the extraction of minerals is
"closely linked with national concerns for energy and the environment");
§ 3, 30 U. S. C. § 1602 ("[I]t is the continuing policy of the United States to
promote an adequate and stable supply of materials necessary to maintain
national security, economic well-being and industrial production with appropriate attention to a long-term balance between resource production,
energy use, a healthy environment, natural resources conservation, and social needs").

85-1200---CONCUR/DISSENT
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMM'N v. GRANITE ROCK CO.

3

extent he finds consistent with Federal law and the purposes of this Act." § 1712( c)(9).
Significantly, the FLPMA only requires the Secretary to listen to the States, not obey them. As the Conference Report
explained: "[T]he ultimate decision as to determining the extent of feasible consistency between [the Secretary's] plans
and [State or local] plans rests with the Secretary of the Interior." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-1724, p. 58 (1976).
The surface management provisions of the FLPMA do not
apply to national forest lands. 43 CFR § 3809.0-5(c) (1985).
Congress first provided for management of these lands in the
Organic Administration Act of 1897. The current version of
that statute delegates to the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to "regulate [the] occupancy and use" of national forests. 16 U. S. C. § 551. The Forest Service, as the Secretary's delegate, has promulgated regulations to control the
"use" .of national forests. 36 CFR §228.1 et seq. (1986).
Persons wishing to mine in the National Forests submit plans
of operation detailing their anticipated activities. If the Forest Service determines that the plans comply with the regulations, it approves them and authorizes the mining operation.
The Court, by focusing on the Forest Service's concern for
preservation of the national forests, characterizes these regulations as "environmental" regulations, in its view something
entirely different from "land use" regulations. Ante, at
11-13.
In fact, the regulation of land use is more complicated than
the Court suggests. First, as is true with respect to the
Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture has
been directed to develop comprehensive plans for the use of
resources located in national forests. See Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 (Forest
Planning Act) § 3(a), as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 1601. The
Forest Planning Act initially did not require the Forest Service to consider the views of state regulators. But when Congress passed the FLPMA in 1976, it also passed the National

-.
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Forest Management Act (NFMA), that amended the Forest
Planning Act. Of special importance, § 6(a) of the NFMA requires the Secretary of Agriculture to coordinate his land
management plans "with the land and resource management
planning processes of State and local governments." 16
U. S. C. § 1604(a). Section 14 specifically requires the Secretary of Agriculture to give state governments "adequate
notice and an opportunity to comment upon the formulation
of standards, criteria, and guidelines applicable to Forest
Service programs." § 1612(a). Thus, it is clear that the
Secretary of Agriculture has the final authority to determine
the best use for federal lands, and that he must consider the
views of state regulators before making a decision. There is
no suggestion in the statute or the legislative history that
state regulators should have the final authority in determining how particular federal lands should be used.
The Forest Service also has a role in implementing the Nation's mineral development policy. The Court shrugs off the
importance of this obligation, noting that "the responsibility
for managing [mineral] resources is in the Secretary of the
Interior." Ante, at 12 (quoting 36 CFR § 228.1 (1986)).
This statement erroneously equates mineral resources management with land use management. Title 43 of the Code of
Federal Regulations details the activities of the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) in this context. Generally, BLM
manages the process by which rights to minerals are obtained
from the United States and protected against others, the
payment of royalties to the Federal Government, and the
conservation of the minerals themselves. In some caseslike oil, gas, and coal-BLM supervises leasing of the right to
extract the materials. But this case involves "hardrock"
minerals governed by the Mining Act of 1872. With respect
to those minerals, the ELM's actions are limited to determining whether the land is subject to location under the mining
laws; whether a mining claim is properly located and recorded; whether assessment work is properly performed; and
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whether the requirements for patenting a claim have been
complied with. See 43 CFR Parts 3800-3870 (1985). None
of these determinations is a "land use" determination in the
sense of balancing mineral development against environmental hazard to surface resources. The Forest Service makes
these determinations through its review of a mining plan of
operation.
The Organic Administration Act of 1897 makes clear that
the Forest Service must act consistently with the federal policy of promoting mineral development. Section 1 of that Act
precludes the Secretary of Agriculture from taking any action that would "prohibit any person from entering upon such
national forests for all proper and lawful purposes, including
that of prospecting, locating, and developing the mineral resources thereof." 16 U. S. C. § 478. 2 Forest Service
materials confirm its duty to balance "[t]he demand for
mineral development . . . against the demand for renewable
resources and the land management agency's responsibility
to reasonably protect the environment." United States
Dept. of Agriculture, Forest Service Minerals Program
Handbook preface (1983). See also Forest Service Manual
§ 2802 (Dec. 1986) (stating that the Forest Service's policy is
to "ensure that exploration, development, and production of
mineral and energy resources are conducted in an environmentally sound manner and that these activities are integrated with planning and management of other national forest resources"); 30 U. S. C. § 1602. In sum, although the
Secretary of the Interior has a substantial responsibility for
managing mineral resources, Congress has entrusted the
task of balancing mineral development and environmental
2

More recently, congressional solicitude for development of federal
mineral resources led Congress to order the President to "coordinate the
responsible departments and agencies to, among other measures . . .
encourage Federal agencies to facilitate availability and development of
domestic resources to meet critical materials needs." 30 U. S. C.
§ 1602(7).
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protection in the national forests to the Department of Agriculture, and its delegate the Forest Service.
II

The Court's analysis of this case focuses on selected provisions of the federal statutes and regulations, to the exclusion
of other relevant provisions and the larger regulatory context. First, it examines the Forest Service regulations
themselves, apart from the statutes that authorize them.
Because these regulations explicitly require the federal permits to comply with specified state environmental standards,
the Court assumes that Congress · intended to allow state
enforcement of any and all state environmental standards.
Careful comparison of the regulations with the authorizing
statutes casts serious doubt on this conclusion. The regulations specifically require compliance with only three types of
state regulation: air quality, see 36 CFR § 228.8(a) (1986);
water quality, see § 228.8(b); and solid waste disposal, see
§ 228.8(c). But the Court fails to mention that the types of
state regulation preserved by § 228.8 already are preserved
by specific nonpre-emption clauses in other federal statutes.
See 42 U. S. C. § 7418(a) (Clean Air Act requires federal
agencies to comply with analogous state regulations); 33
U. S. C. § 1323(a) (similar provision of the Clean Water Act);
42 U. S. C. § 6961 (similar provision of the Solid Waste Disposal Act). The Forest Service's specific preservation of
certain types of state regulation-already preserved by federal law-hardly suggests an implicit intent to allow the
States to apply other types of regulation to activities on
federal lands. Indeed the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius suggests the contrary. 3
8
The Court rests this part of its pre-emption analysis on Hillsborough
County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707 (1985).
In that case, the Court stated: "[W]e will pause before saying that the
mere volume and complexity of [an agency's] regulations indicate that the
agency did in fact intend to pre-empt." ld., at 718. Hillsborough , however, is quite different from this case. First, the state regulations were
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The second part of the Court's analysis considers both the
NFMA and the FLPMA. The Court assumes, ante, at 11,
that these statutes "pre-empt the extension of state land use
plans onto unpatented mining claims in national forest lands."
But the Court nevertheless holds that the Coastal Commission can require Granite Rock to secure a state permit before
conducting mining operations in a national forest. This conclusion rests on a distinction between "land use planning"
and "environmental regulation." In the Court's view, the
NFMA and the FLPMA indicate a congressional intent to
pre-empt state land use regulations, but not state environmental regulations. I find this analysis unsupportable,
either as an interpretation of the governing statutes or as a
matter of logic.
The basis for the alleged distinction is that Congress has
understood land use planning and environmental regulation
to be distinct activities. The only statute cited for this proposition is § 202(c)(8) of the FLPMA, 43 U. S. C. § 1712(c)(8),
that requires the Secretary of the Interior's land use plans to
"provide for compliance with applicable pollution control
laws, including State and Federal air, water, noise, or other
pollution standards or implementation plans." But this statute provides little support for the majority's analysis. A
section mandating consideration of environmental standards
in the formulation of land use plans does not demonstrate a
designed to ensure the health of plasma donors, an aim entirely separate
from the aim of the federal regulations, to ensure the purity of the donated
plasma. In this case, by contrast, federal authorities already have considered the environmental effects of Granite Rock's mine. The California
Coastal Commission seeks only to reconsider the decision of the federal authorities. In any event, the argument for pre-emption in this case does
not rest on the Forest Service regulations alone, but also on the comprehensive regulatory system enacted by Congress. The Court cannot make
Hillsborough controlling simply by considering the regulations separately
from their statutory source. As I explain, irifra, at 10-12, the complex of
applicable statutes and regulations, considered as a whole, pre-empts the
Coastal Commission's permit requirement.
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general separation between "land use planning" and "environmental regulat~on." Rather, § 202(c)(8) recognizes that
the Secretary's land use planning will affect the environment,
and thus directs the Secretary to comply with certain pollution standards.
Nor does this section support the Court's ultimate conclusion, that Congress intended the Secretary's plans to comply
with all state environmental regulations. As I have explained supra, at 6, other federal statutes require compliance
with the listed standards. 4 Also, because the FLPMA requires compliance only with "applicable" standards, it is difficult to treat this one section as an independent and controlling command that the Secretary comply with all state
environmental standards. Rather, viewing the complex of
statutes and regulations as a whole, it is reasonable to view
§ 202(c)(8) simply as a recognition that the Secretary's plans
must comply with standards made applicable to federal activities by other federal laws.
The only other authority cited by the Court for the distinction between environmental regulation and land use planning
is a Forest Service regulation stating that the Forest Service's rules do not "provide for the management of mineral
resources," 36 CFR § 228.1 (1986). From this, the Court
concludes that the Forest Service enforces environmental
regulation but does not engage in land use planning. This
conclusion misunderstands the division of authority between
• The Forest Service regulations discussed above mention a slightly different set of environmental standards than does the FLPMA. Both provisions specifically preserve air and water standards. The Forest Service
regulations also mention solid waste disposal standards; the Land Management Act also mentions noise control standards. Cf. 42 U. S. C.
§ 4901(a)(3) (Noise Control Act provision stating that the "primary responsibility for control of noise rests with State and local governments"). The
slight difference between the two lists of pollution standards, however, is
insignificant. The feature that all the listed standards have in common is
that other federal statutes specifically preserve a place for state regulation. See supra, at 6.
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the BLM and the Forest Service. As explained supra, at
4-5, the BLM's management of minerals does not entail management of surface resources or the evaluation of surface
impacts. Indeed, the Court acknowledges that the Forest
Service is "responsible for the management of the surface
impacts of mining on federal forest lands." Ante, at 11.
The Forest Planning Act and the NFMA direct the Secretary
of Agriculture and the Forest Service to develop comprehensive plans for the use of forest resources. Similarly, the Organic Administration Act commands the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations governing the "occupancy
and use" of national forests, 16 U. S. C. § 551. These regulations are integral to the Forest Service's management of
national forests. To view them as limited to environmental
concerns ignores both the Forest Service's broader responsibility to manage the use of forest resources and the
federal policy of making mineral resources accessible to
development. 5 The Coastal Commission has no interest in
the matters within the jurisdiction of the BLM; the regula5
The lack of statutory support for the Court's distinction is not surprising, because-with all respect-it seems to me that the distinction is one
without a rational difference. As the Court puts it: "Land use planning in
essence chooses particular uses for the land; environmental regulation, at
its core, does not mandate particular uses of the land but requires only
that, however the land is used, damage to the environment is kept within
prescribed limits." Ante, at 11-12. This explanation separates one of the
reasons for Forest Service decisions from the decisions themselves. In
considering a proposed use of a parcel of land in the national forest, the
Forest Service regulations consider the damage the use will cause to the
environment as well as the federal interest in making resources on public
lands accessible to development. The Forest Service may decide that the
proposed use is appropriate, that it is inappropriate, or that it would be
appropriate only if further steps are taken to protect the environment.
The Court divides this decision into two distinct types of regulation and
holds that Congress intended to pre-empt duplicative state regulation of
one part but not the other. Common sense suggests that it would be best
for one expert federal agency, the Forest Service, to consider all these
factors and decide what use best furthers the relevant federal policies.
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tions that it seeks to impose concern matters wholly within
the control of the Forest Service. Thus, this regulation does
not support the Court's distinction between environmental
regulation and land use planning.
The most troubling feature of the Court's analysis is that it
is divorced from the realities of its holding. The Court cautions that its decision allows only "reasonable" environmental
regulation and that it does not give the Coastal Commission a
veto over Granite Rock's mining activities. But if the
Coastal Commission can require Granite Rock to secure a
permit before allowing mining operations to proceed, it necessarily can forbid Granite Rock from conducting these operations. It may be that reasonable environmental regulations
would not force Granite Rock to close its mine. This misses
the point. The troubling fact is that the Court has given a
state authority-here the Coastal Commission-the power to
prohibit Granite Rock from exercising the rights granted by
its Forest Service permit. This abdicatiQn of federal control
over the use of federal land is unprecedented. 6

III
Apart from my disagreement with the Court's characterization of the governing statutes, its pre-emption analysis
accords little or no weight to both the location of the mine in a
national forest, and the comprehensive nature of the federal
statutes that authorized Granite Rock's federal permit.
One important factor in pre-emption analysis is the relative
weight of the state and federal interests in regulating a particular matter. Cf. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 66-69
(1941). The Court recognizes that the mine in this case is
located in a national forest, but curiously attaches no significance to that fact. The Property Clause specifically grants
I express no view as to the Court's conclusion that the Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972 (CZMA), 16 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq. (1982 ed. and
Supp. III), does not pre-empt the state regulation in this case. See ante,
at 14-17.
6
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Congress "Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States." U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 3,
cl. 2. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243
U. S. 389, 404 (1917). This provision may not of its own
force pre-empt the authority of a State to regulate activities
on federal land, but it clearly empowers Congress to limit the
extent to which a State may regulate in this area. In light of
this clear constitutional allocation of power, the location of
the mine in a national forest should make us less reluctant to
find pre-emption than we are in other contexts.
The state regulation in this case is particularly intrusive
because it takes the form of a separate, and duplicative, permit system. As the Court has recognized, state permit requirements are especially likely to intrude on parallel federal
authority, because they effectively give the State the power
to veto the federal project. See International Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U. S. - - , - - (1987); First Iowa HydroElectric Cooperative v. FPC, 328 U. S. 152, 164 (1946). Although the intrusive effect of duplicative state permit systems may not lead to a finding of pre-emption in all cases, it
certainly is relevant to a careful pre-emption analysis.
The dangers of duplicative permit requirements are evident in this case. The federal permit system reflects a careful balance between two important federal interests: the interest in developing mineral resources on federal land, and
the interest in protecting our national forests from environmental harm. The Forest Service's issuance of a permit to
Granite Rock reflects its conclusion that environmental concerns associated with Granite Rock's mine do not justify restricting mineral development on this portion of a federal forest. Allowing the Coastal Commission to strike a different
balance necessarily conflicts with the federal system.
Furthermore, as discussed supra, at 2-4, Congress already
has provided that affected States must be afforded an opportunity to communicate their concerns to the federal regu-

1
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lators charged with deciding how federal lands should be
used. 7 Because Congress has ensured that any federal decision will reflect the environmental concerns of affected
States, a duplicative system of permits would serve ·no purpose. Indeed, the potential for conflict between state and
federal decisions has obvious disadvantages.
IV

In summary, it is fair to say that, commencing in 1872,
Congress has created an almost impenetrable maze of arguably relevant legislation in no less than a half-dozen statutes,
augmented by the regulations of two Departments of the Executive. There is little cause for wonder that the language
of these statutes and regulations has generated considerable
confusion. There is an evident need for Congress to enact a
single, comprehensive statute for the regulation of federal
lands.
7
The discussion in Part I deals primarily with the FLPMA and the
NFMA. In this case, the Coastal Commission actually had yet another
statutory basis for influencing the federal decisionmaking process.
Because Granite Rock's mine is near the California Coast, the Coastal
Commission has a right to consistency review under the CZMA. Thus, if
the Coastal Commission had voiced its concerns, the Secretary could not
have approved this permit unless he determined, after a hearing, "that the
activity is consistent with the objectives of [the CZMA] or is otherwise necessary in the interest of national security." 16 U. S. C. § 1456(c)(3)(A).
Although the Coastal Commission had notice of Granite Rock's application
to the Forest Service, it did not object to Granite Rock's activities until
two years after the application was approved and Granite Rock began mining pursuant to the federal permit. Because the Coastal Commission
failed to make a timely complaint to the Forest Service, it forfeited its
right to consistency review under the CZMA.
By noting the provision for consistency review, I do not imply that the
CZMA itself pre-empts the Coastal Commission's permit requirement.
See n. 6, supra. I believe, however, that the provision for consistency
review, considered with the other specific provisions for state participation
in the federal regulatory process, indicates that Congress did not believe
the States could have imposed separate permit requirements, even before
passage of the CZMA.

...
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Having said this, it is at least clear that duplicative federal
and state permit requirements create an intolerable conflict
in decisionmaking. 8 In view of the Property Clause of the
Constitution, as well as common sense, federal authority
must control with respect to land "belonging to the United
States." Yet, the Court's opinion today approves a system
of twofold authority with respect to environmental matters.
The result of this holding is that state regulators, whose
views on environmental and mineral policy may conflict with
the views of the Forest Service, have the power, with respect to federal lands, to forbid activity expressly authorized
by the Forest Service. I dissent.

8
The Court concludes that Granite Rock has failed to demonstrate a
conflict because it rejects my conclusion that land use regulation and environmental regulation are indistinguishable and because it sees no harm in
allowing state permit requirements to supersede the decisions of federal
officials. Ante, at 18.
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Dear Nino:
I have now had an opportunity to take a look at your
dissent ln which you conclude that the Coastal Commission
only has land use authority.

Although I would h~sitate to rest a deciston in this
case primarily on a rejection of the state agency's interpretation of the Caljfornia statute, I do not think vour
opinion is necessarily inconsistent with my dissenting opinion. If there are changes I could make that would enable
you to join my dissent, I would be glad to consider them.
Sincerely,

Justice Scalia
LPP/vde

'<

'

I

'

.ftt¥rtmt Qf01trl of tlrt 'Jnittb ~ta.ttS'
Jlagfringtttn, ~. Of. 2(l~l{.~

.~

'l
I

CHAMBERS OF

February 13, 1987

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

/
85-1200 - California Coastal Comm'n
v. Granite Rock Company

Dear Nino,
Please

join

me

in

your

opinion in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Scalia
Copies to the Conference

r·· -

dissenting

ar4tlttt qf tlrt 'Jnittb .Jtattg
Jlulfhtghm. ;!3. ar. 2llbf~~

.Jnprtm.t

(

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA

February 18, 1987

Re:

No. 85-1200 - Calif. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock

Dear Lewis:
I was in New Orleans when your memorandum of February 13
arrived, and only had time to consider it yesterday.
Much as I
would like to merge our dissents, I am afraid that I do not agree
with the fundamental proposition that states are prohibited from
imposing environmental controls on federal lands.
I cannot
imagine any suggested revision of your opinion that would
overcome that difficulty.
Would it be possible for you to reconsider the question
whether my opinion contradicts the state agency's interpretation
of its own state's statute? As far as I am aware, California has
not contended that the statute is not a land-use statute, but
only that it would not use it for land-use purposes in the
present case.
My opinion asserts that is irrelevant.
Whether we can get together or not, I appreciate your
effort at trying.
I will be happy to talk the matter over if you
think that would be useful.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
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Please join me.
Sincerely,
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